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INDIVIDUAL BANKRUPTCY:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF A
SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS©
BY IAIN D.C.

This article presents preliminary findings from an
empirical study of individuals who filed for bankruptcy
in the Toronto bankruptcy district in 1994. The central
findings are that bankrupts are both asset- and incomepoor at the time of declaring bankruptcy, and have
much higher ratios of debt-to-income than the general
population. Bankrupts are not drawn solely from low
status occupations, but neither are they drawn
significantly from the highest status occupations. The
major reasons for declaring bankruptcy are adverse
employment changes and business failure. There has
been a large rise in the number of women declaring
bankruptcy since earlier studies in the 1970s. The
author concludes that bankruptcy seemed to be
providing a safety net against entrepreneurial risk and
adverse employment changes. Further areas of
investigation identified by the author include the role of
the trustee in bankruptcy in the bankruptcy process,
and the relationship between empirical studies of
bankruptcy and socio-legal analysis of the use of the
legal system by different groups.

RAMSAY*

Cet article pr~sente des conclusions prdliminaires d'une
6tude empirique des individus qui font la demande de
la faillite dans la r6gion torontoise en 1994. Les
conclusions principales montrent que ceux qui font
faillite sont a la fois faibles en actifs et en revenus au
moment ofi ils d6clarent leurs faillites, et ils ont une
proportion plus 6lev~e de d6bits par rapport aux
revenus que la population en gdn6ral. Ceux qui font
faillites ne viennent pas uniquement des professions
modestes, ni particuli~rement des professions de statut
le plus 6lev6. Les raisons principales pour d6clarer la
faillite sont les changements d6favorables Al'emploi et
la faillite des entreprises. II y a eu une grande
augmentation dans le nombre de femmes d6clarant la
faillite depuis les premires 6tudes dans les ann6es
1970. L'auteur en conclut que la faillite semble
pourvoir un filet de protection contre les risques
d'entreprise et les changements d6favorables A
'emploi. D'autres domaines de recherche identifies par
l'auteur incluent le r6le des syndics de faillite dans le
processus de la faillite, et le rapport entre les 6tudes
empiriques de la faillite et l'analyse socio-16gale de
l'utilisation du syst~me juridique par des groupes
diff6rents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is one part of a study of individual bankruptcy in
Canada.1 The study is an exploration of the role of individual bankruptcy
as a safety net against life's uncertainties in a postindustrial economy
with a declining welfare state. I am interested in questions such as the
role of bankruptcy as a potentially welfarist institution in private law,
whether a new paradigm of bankruptcy law is developing, and how this
might relate to changing conceptions of the welfare state. In addition,
there is the further question of how bankruptcy fits within an
increasingly sophisticated system of credit-granting harnessed to
information technology.
When this study was commenced in 1996, there had been no
published empirical studies of individual bankruptcy in Canada since the
early 1980s. There was a modest but growing newspaper coverage of
apparently large increases in bankruptcy filings, and questions were
being raised as to whether "too many" individuals were declaring
bankruptcy, or whether it was becoming "too easy" to declare
bankruptcy in the light of reforms to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
(BM) 2 in 1992. Public debate on these issues seemed to oscillate between
blaming consumers for the irresponsible management of their finances,
or blaming aggressive lending practices by creditors for the increases in
bankruptcy filings. It seemed unclear whether bankrupts should be
characterized as unfortunates, amoral calculators, or inadequate
of the same name in T. Wilhelmsson &
S. Hurri, eds., From Dissonance to Sense: Welfare State Expectations, Privatisation,and PrivateLaw
(Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1999) c. 16. See also I.D.C. Ramsay, "Models of Consumer Bankruptcy:
Implications for Research and Policy" (1997) 20 J. Consumer Pol'y 269.

I I discuss some of the broader issues in a short paper

2 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 [hereinafter BIA], as am. by An Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act and to
amend the Income Tax Act in consequence thereof, S.C. 1992, c. 27. A central change in 1992 was the
removal of the necessity to apply to court for a discharge for first-time bankrupts. However, it is not
clear that this made much difference in practice, since the discharge hearings were often cursory

and routinized.
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individuals. 3 These debates were a muted refrain of the more heated
controversies in the United States where, notwithstanding a booming
economy, personal filings for bankruptcy in 1996 surpassed the symbolic
figure of one million.
The data reported in this article are therefore a contribution to
understanding the current social reality of bankruptcy. I present
preliminary findings from a sample of Ontario bankrupts drawn from
1994 filings, and outline the economic and social situation of individual
bankrupts, and the process of bankruptcy from the initial declaration of
bankruptcy to the closing of the bankruptcy file by the trustee in
bankruptcy. Part II outlines the central findings of existing social science
studies in North America and how they framed the questions that I
explore in the empirical data. Part III presents the data from the file
study. Part IV explores the issues and questions raised by the empirical
data.
The central findings outlined in Part III are that individual
bankrupts are both asset- and income-poor at the time of declaring
bankruptcy, and have much higher ratios of debt-to-income than the
general population. They are drawn primarily from people between the
ages of 30 and 50, and there has been a large increase in female
bankrupts, who comprise 44 per cent of the sample. Bankrupts do not
work solely in low-status occupations, but neither are they drawn from
the highest status occupations; one-third are unemployed at the time of
declaring bankruptcy. There is evidence that individuals have exhausted
the value of existing assets-such as a home-in an effort to stave off
bankruptcy. The primary reasons for declaring bankruptcy are adverse
employment changes and business failure. The majority appear to be the
victims of changed circumstances, and have run out of available social
and economic resources to deal with these circumstances. In one-third of
the sample, bankruptcy is a household, rather than an individual,
decision. I conclude that bankruptcy appears to be playing its role as a
safety net by providing a fresh start for individuals who are
overburdened with debt and have little chance of repaying their debts. I
also note that, as a consequence of current reporting practices, existing
official statistics understate the number of small business bankruptcies.
Analysis of the formal process of bankruptcy indicates that it is, for the
great 'majority a routinized process, with little formal involvement of
3 I take this tripartite distinction from Michael Adler, who developed this distinction in
relation to debt enforcement: see M. Adler & E. Wozniak, "More and Less Coercive Ways of
Settling Debts" in H.M. Drucker & N.L. Drucker, eds., The Scottish Government Yearbook 1980
(Edinburgh: Paul Harris, 1980) 161.
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creditors or the courts. However, individuals pay a relatively high
monetary price for using the process, although this is, in some respects,
camouflaged from them by the manner in which they pay for the process.
At the outset, I enter a number of caveats in relation to these
findings. While the sample is a random sample drawn from a large and
diverse bankruptcy district, 4 it is not a representative sample of the
Canadian or Ontario bankruptcy populationS In this preliminary report,
I provide comparisons with the general population, but they should be
treated with caution given the nature of the sample. In addition, in
discussing the causes of bankruptcy I am examining the end of a process.
Ideally, one would gather data on the full history of the paths that led an
individual to declare bankruptcy, and compare this with a control group
in the general population. I have made what I believe to be reasonable
inferences about this trajectory from the data, but a full examination of
the paths into and out of bankruptcy remains for the future. However,
given the woeful state of systematic empirical information on individual
bankruptcy and insolvency in Canada, I believe that, in conjunction with
the report by Saul Schwartz in this Symposium, 6 there is now a body of
findings that will provide researchers with directions for further
research. At a minimum, my findings and those of Schwartz call into
question the thrust of recent federal reforms, and the stereotypes
suggested by influential groups-namely, that bankrupts are credit card

4 The Toronto bankruptcy district processed just under 20 per cent of all bankruptcies in
Canada in 1994. For a full discussion of my findings, see Part III, below.
5 1 will in later work compare the data with those drawn from census districts that correspond
to the bankruptcy district.

6 See S. Schwartz, "The Empirical Dimensions of Consumer Bankruptcy: Results From a
Survey of Canadian Bankrupts" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 83. This article is based on the findings
from an earlier study by Saul Schwartz and Leigh Anderson: see infra note 45.
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abusers7 or relatively well-off individuals who are taking advantage of
the system.
In 1994, over-indebted individuals could choose to declare
bankruptcy or make a consumer proposal to their creditors. The
overwhelming majority of individuals chose bankruptcy. In the case of
bankruptcy, an individual was required to turn over his or her nonexempt assets to the trustee, who is almost always a chartered
accountant. In return, a first-time bankrupt would receive an automatic
discharge of unsecured debts after nine months. The rights of secured
creditors, such as home mortgagees or secured lenders on automobiles,
to seize their security was unaffected by the bankruptcy. Certain debts
were non-dischargeable, such as alimony, or those contracted by fraud.
In addition, as a result of amendments to the BIA introduced in 1992,
bankrupts were required to undergo two counselling sessions before
their discharge, and failure to do so resulted in withholding automatic
discharge.8 A discharge was automatic only if there was no objection to
discharge by a creditor, the trustee, or the Superintendent of
Bankruptcy. The grounds for objection were very broad and would
permit an objection in almost every case of individual bankruptcy. A
consumer proposal permitted the debtor to make a proposal to creditors
to pay off all or a portion of his or her debts over a period not exceeding
five years. Secured creditors were not included within the scope of the

7 Frank Bennett, a lawyer and Co-Vice Chair of the National Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Section of the Canadian Bar Association, made the following comments in his submission (5
September 1991) to the Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs in consideration
of Bill C-22, An Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act, and to amend the Income Tax Act in consequence
thereof,3d Sess., 34th Pan., 1992 (assented to 23 June 1992, S.C. 1992, c. 27):
It is not uncommon for a consumer debtor, prior to going bankrupt to outfit himself or
herself, take trips and run up excessive amounts of debt under credit cards. In fact, they
would borrow from one credit card to pay the other.
In my view that is tantamount to fraud. The debtor effectively has no intent of repaying
the credit card holder. There is an abuse in the system today.
I do a lot of collection work. I act for three large Canadian banks and I see excessive
abuse of credit cards today.
Canada, Minutes of Proceedingsand Evidence of the Standing Committee on Consumerand Corporate
Affairs and Government Operations(Ottawa: The Committee, 1989-1993) at 9:19-9:20.
8 See BtA, supra note 2, ss. 157.1(1)-(3).

1999]

A Socio-LegalAnalysis

21

proposal. 9 Under a proposal, a debtor might keep his or her assets and
avoid an actual declaration of bankruptcy.
The official premise of Canadian bankruptcy law is that, in the
case of individuals, it is designed to provide a discharge of debts for the
"honest but unfortunate" debtor who is then able to make a "fresh start"
in life. However, there has always been some hesitation as to how
"fresh" that start should be, as measured by assets and income that the
debtor may shield from his or her creditors. The more ambiguous
concept of "rehabilitation" or "financial rehabilitation" is often used in
contemporary discussions of bankruptcy.10
II. EXISTING SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES
A. The 1970s and ConventionalWisdom: Bankruptcy
Forthe Working-ClassMale

Studies in the United States and Canada indicated that
bankruptcy was a remedy used primarily by working-class males. The
only systematic Canadian study of this periodll outlined the following
picture of the consumer bankrupt in 1977:
Most (two-thirds) are male; in fact, many, if not most, cases of female bankruptcy are
precipitated by the husband's bankruptcy.... [T]he typical consumer bankrupt would be a
married male in the early to middle stages of the family life cycle with one or more
children.... [T]here is some evidence that consumer bankrupts have a higher incidence of
marital breakdown than the population at large.12

91 have not discussed the possibility of a consolidation order under Part X of the lIA. This Part
is not in force in Ontario, and is used by a small number of debtors. For a full discussion of the
relevant legal provisions, see J.S. Ziegel, "The Philosophy and Design of Contemporary Consumer
Bankruptcy Systems: A Canada-United States Comparison" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 205 at
249-52.
10 See Canada, Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Legislation (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970) (Chair: R. Tass6) at 87: "We believe
that, in respect of the individual debtor, the principal objective of the bankruptcy system should be
to rehabilitate him and give him an opportunity to make a fresh economic start in life. Whether the
debtor is good or bad should not affect his right in this regard." See also Royal Bank of Canada v.
North American Life Assurance Co., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 325 [hereinafter Royal Bank] in which Gonthier
J. stated at 337: "the first such purpose is to ensure the equitable distribution of a bankrupt debtor's
assets among the estate's creditors, while the second is to provide for the financial rehabilitation of
insolvent persons."
11 See J.W. Brighton & J.A. Connidis, Consumer Bankrupts in Canada (Ottawa: Consumer
and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1982).
12 Ibid. at 22.
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[Consumer bankrupts do not constitute a representative sampling of the labour force.

[Consumer bankrupts are drawn heavily from the lowest skill levels. 13
a much higher degree of unemployment and job turnover
[Consumer bankrupts] exhibit
14
than the population at large.
[C]onsumer bankrupts are generally drawn from the lower socioeconomic groups,
whether measured by income or by occupation. 15

Wayne Brighton and Justin Connidis, the study's authors,
concluded that consumer bankruptcy is "clearly a class-related
phenomenon, occurring mostly among the lower levels of the working
class," 16 although there was a significant minority drawn from the higher
income groups. Outstanding liabilities were not very high, so that the
typical bankruptcy was that of "a low-skilled or unskilled worker forced
into bankruptcy for relatively small total debt amounts." 17 Consumer
and personal debt accounted for the largest portion of liabilities with the
most common creditors being finance and acceptance companies.
Bankrupts had few assets, and under 20 per cent were home-owners at
the time of declaring bankruptcy.
Given these low asset levels, it is not surprising that unsecured
creditors received little by way of dividend. In four-fifths of the cases,
there was no money for distribution after the payment of the trustee's
fees. 18 In almost 50 per cent of cases, bankruptcy was related to
consumer debt; 14 per cent to the operation of, or the guarantee of, a
business; 15 per cent to unemployment; and 14 per cent to health
reasons and other misfortunes beyond the debtors' control.' 9 The study
concluded that, although bankrupts did not fit the image of "high
rollers" walking away from their debts, the majority showed "a lack of
foresight and money management ability," and their plight was partly
attributable "to other deficiencies in life skills and resources which are

13 Ibid. at 24.
14

Ibid. at 29.

15 Ibid. at 31.
16

Ibid. at 73.

17

Ibid. at 75.

18

Ibid. at 64.

19

Ibi at 32-34.
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associated with but not limited to the lower social classes." 20 The study
also concluded that creditors "must bear most of the responsibility for
consumer insolvency," since they appeared to have taken few measures
to detect and prevent consumer insolvencies. 21
This study was conducted at a time when the federal Office of
the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB), through the Federal Insolvency
Trustee Agency (FITA), provided trustee services to those who could not
afford the services of a private trustee. Between one-half and one-third
of consumer bankruptcies were processed under this program, 22 and
Brighton and Connidis noted that those using this service had a much
lower level of income than those who used private trustees. 23 Since the
termination of this program in the late 1970s, a pro bono program has
existed for individuals unable to afford a trustee. However, it appears to
be rarely used. While this may demonstrate that private trustees have
found innovative techniques to finance low-income bankruptcies, 24 it is
also possible that fewer low-income individuals are able to access
bankruptcy than in the 1970s.
There were also studies during this period of Part X of the BIA
and the Quebec "Lacombe Law," 2s both of which permitted debtors to
consolidate their debts and repay them over time.26 These studies
showed that the overwhelming majority of debtors were male (in the
Lacombe study, 83.6 per cent) who worked in either the skilled or
unskilled labour categories. 27

20

Ibid. at 77.

21 Ibid.
22

Ibid. at 4.

23 Although there does exist currently a pro bono program, it is not on the same scale as the
Federal Insolvency Trustee Agency (rITA) program: see Office of the Superintendent of
Bankruptcy, Directive No. 11: Bankruptcy Assistance Program (issued 23 October 1986), online:

Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy <http:llstrategis.ic.gc.calpicslbr/dirll.pdf> (date
accessed: 10 August 1999).
24 See Part III(H)(3), below.
25 See Arts. 652-659 C.C.P.

26 See references to these studies in Brighton & Connidis, supra note 11 at Appendix B; and
M. Trebilcock & A. Shulman, "The Pathology of Credit Breakdown" (1976) 22 McGill L.J. 415. For

a study of the Lacombe Law, see C. Masse, E. MacKaay & J. Hbrard, Vivre ou Exister?: Ftude de
l'efficacit6 sociale juridiques d'aide aux debiteurs surendettds (Montr6al: Group de recherche en
jurim6trie, Facult6 de droit, Universit6 de Montr6al, 1975) [hereinafter Vivre ou Exister?]. See also
T. Hira, "Socio-Economic Characteristics of Families in Bankruptcy" (1982) 32 Can. Home Econ. 1.

27 See Vivre ou xister?, supra note 26 at 44.
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Other studies of individual debt recovery procedures, such as
wage garnishment, confirmed the picture of individual debtors as
working-class males. In a study of the use of wage garnishment in
Hamilton, Ontario, Thomas Puckett indicated that the majority were
low-income earners, employed in blue-collar occupations, and renters
rather than home-owners. 28 The major reason for the inability to repay a
debt among this group was a change in life circumstance such as
unemployment (44 per cent). Twenty-six per cent cited imprudence, and
22 per cent claimed that their creditor had sold shoddy goods for which
they had simply refused to pay. 29 Michael Trebilcock and Arthur
Shulman's study of individuals who had their goods seized or wages
garnisheed in 1972 indicated that almost 85 per cent were male, and 25
per cent were unemployed (compared with an average Montreal rate of
unemployment of 7 per cent at that time).30
These Canadian studies might be compared to early United
States data. A Brookings Institution study3 l found that the typical
bankrupt in 1964 was a blue-collar worker, nearly 40 years old, and
married with four dependants. It concluded that "he presents a picture
of neither poverty nor instability."32 The main causes of bankruptcy were
identified as poor debt management, family health reasons, and
interruptions in employment. There was a large disproportion of Blacks
(38 per cent) among debtors. Later studies of single jurisdictions
indicated that bankrupts were "the near poor," and that unanticipated
medical expenses played a significant role in contributing to the financial
problems of the bankrupt. Only about 15 to 20 per cent of the debtors
owned their homes 3 3

28 See T.C. Puckett, "Credit Casualties: A Study of Wage Garnishment in Ontario" (1978) 28
U.T.L.J. 95 at 106-07.
29

IbiL at 108.

30 See Trebilcock & Shulman, supra note 26 at 426-27.

31 See D.T. Stanley & M. Girth, with V. Countryman et al., Bankruptcy: Problem, Process,
Reform (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971).
32
Ibid at 42.
33 See P. Shuchman, "The Average Bankrupt: A Description and Analysis of 753 Personal

Bankruptcy Filings in Nine States" (1983) 88 Com. L.J. 288; and P. Shuchman, "New Jersey Debtors
1982-1983: An Empirical Study" (1985) 15 Seton Hall L. Rev. 541.
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B. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook: Bankruptcy and the Middle Class
The major study of the 1980s in the United States was that of
Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook,34 which
challenged conventional wisdom about the demography of bankrupts.
Their study was based on data from ten judicial districts in three states
(Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania), which accounted for approximately
13 per cent of all non-business bankruptcy filings in 1981. The sample
included those filing under Chapter 7 (straight bankruptcy) and Chapter
13 (wage earner plan) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.35 The three
states were chosen because of differences in exemptions and the fact that
all three have diverse economies. The authors updated their study in
1991 with further file analysis and questionnaires.
There were four important developments in their findings
compared to earlier studies: (1) the conclusion that bankruptcy was a
middle-class phenomenon or that bankrupts were a "cross-section of
America;" (2) an exploration of the discrete sub-groups who used
bankruptcy; (3) the use of debt-to-income ratios as an explanation for
bankruptcy; and (4) the highlighting of local legal culture, rather than
legal exemptions, as a significant explanation of debtors' choice of filing
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
The authors found that, although bankrupts earned about onethird less than non-bankrupts at the time of bankruptcy, bankrupts were
employed in similar occupations and occupational categories to the
general population. They concluded that "debtors are not
overwhelmingly blue collar, nor are they employed in marginal jobs,"
that "they are not in the best middle-class jobs," and that "bankrupt
debtors are our neighbours." 36 In their updated study of bankrupts in
1991 the authors concluded:

34

See T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and

Consumer Credit inAmerica (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) [hereinafterAs We Forgive
Our Debtors]. The authors updated their study in 1991, and some results are available in T.A.
Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook, "Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial

Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991" (1991) 68 Am. Bankr. L.J. 121 [hereinafter
"Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later"]; and T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook,
"Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States: A Study of Alleged Abuse and of Local Legal
Culture" (1997) 20 J. Consumer Pol'y 223 [hereinafter "Local Legal Culture"].
35 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1998) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
36

As We Forgive OurDebtors, supra note 34 at 102.
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[T]he users of the system are a broad cross-section of middle America. The system
functions to provide middle-class debt relief ... .37

The debtors are not the homeless nor the welfare recipients; they are not the patrons of
the soup kitchens nor the jails. By and large, they are quite middle-class in background
and perhaps in outlook. They are in deep financial trouble. 38

Buttressing this conclusion was the finding that 52 per cent of
bankrupts were home-owners (compared to the general population rate
of home-ownership of 64 per cent), which is higher than other studies in
which only 27 per cent of bankrupts were home-owners. 39 Bankrupts
were more likely to have completed high school and attended college
than the general population, but less likely to have completed a college
degree. 40 There was one distinct difference between bankrupts and the
general population-almost 20 per cent were owners of small businesses,
compared with about 7 per cent in the general population. 41
A central reason for bankruptcy appeared to be interruptions in
income, since although there were not high levels of unemployment
among debtors at the time of bankruptcy, many had suffered significant
income volatility in the two years preceding their assignment. Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook concluded that bankruptcy was a safety net
against an unfortunate change of circumstances, which could happen to
anyone through miscalculation or unemployment, and that this safety
net was particularly significant in a country with the most limited forms
of social security and health care insurance among the western
industrialized countries. There was no obvious evidence that bankrupts
had a character trait that differentiates them from the rest of the
population, nor did their data indicate significant numbers of individuals
abusing the system by shedding debt that they could have repaid.
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook underlined both the
homogeneity and the heterogeneity of the bankruptcy population.
Although all bankrupts had high debt-to-income ratios (the ratio of
aggregate debt to annual pre-tax income) in comparison with the general
population, they could also be divided into discrete sub-groups: existing
37

"Local Legal Culture," supranote 34 at 225.

38

Ibid. at 234.

39 See, for example, Credit Research Center, ConsumerBankruptcy Study (Lafayette, Ind.:
Purdue University, Krannert Graduate School of Business, 1982) at 12. The Consumer Research

Center study was based on questionnaire interviews where only two-fifths of debtors approached
agreed to be interviewed.
40 See "Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later," supra note 34 at 130, n. 19.
41 See "Local Legal Culture,"supranote 34 at 232.

1999]

A Socio-LegalAnalysis

and past entrepreneurs (about 20 per cent); home-owners (52 per cent);
women (single filings by women constituted about 40 per cent of the
single filing cases); the repeaters (3.7 per cent); medical debts (1-2 per
cent); and "credit card junkies" (2 per cent, defined as credit card debt
totalling more than one-half of the debtor's annual income, and where it
is 75 per cent of the total unsecured debt, and the debtor is in the top 15
per cent of the absolute amount of credit card debt). Their study was the
first systematic analysis of gender and bankruptcy, and drew attention to
the fact that "the economic circumstances of women are the worst we
have examined, and they reflect the precarious position of women not in
bankruptcy." 42
Their final conclusion related to the role of local legal culture.
Much discussion of bankruptcy policy in the United States has focused
on the impact of the different state exemptions for assets in creating
incentives to file for bankruptcy or choose a straight discharge, rather
than a repayment alternative. It had been assumed that changes in
exemptions would, ceteris paribus, affect the propensity to file for
bankruptcy since it would enter the cost-benefit calculation of a rational
debtor. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook concluded that exemptions did
not seem to influence filings. Rather, the particular local legal
culture-reflected in the practices of lawyers and judges-had a decisive
impact on decisions to file under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.43 This
conclusion questioned the validity of existing law-and-economics models
of debtor behaviour,44 and their predictions on the impact of reforms of
exemption laws.
The Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook study provided the
backdrop to my study. Mention should also be made of the recent 1997
Canadian study by Saul Schwartz and Leigh Anderson, whose central
findings were that bankrupts "were in severe economic straits with low
incomes, poor job prospects, and a history of social assistance or
unemployment insurance receipt." 45 A summary of this study is reported

42

As We Forgive Our Debtors,supra note 34 at 157.

43

Ibid. at 246-52. For a further discussion of local legal culture, see J. Braucher "Lawyers and

Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures" (1993) 67 Am. Bankr. L.J. 501.

44 For a study that incorporates the findings of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook into the
economic model, see "A Reformed Economic Model of Consumer Bankruptcy" Note (1996) 109

Harv. L Rev. 1338.
45 S. Schwartz & L. Anderson, An Empirical Study of CanadiansSeeking PersonalBankruptcy

Protection(Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1998) at 18, online: Industry Canada <http:l strategis.ic.ge.ca/
SSG/caOO889e.html> (date accessed: 10 August 1999).
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elsewhere in this Symposium, 46 but it is relevant to note that a central
finding was that Canadian bankrupts did not seem to be drawn from the
middle classes or a cross-section of the population. They differed little
from the lower-income individuals described by Brighton and Connidis
in their study of 1977 bankrupts. The main changes were the growth in
women filers, student loan bankruptcies, and self-employed bankrupts.
III. THE FILE STUDY47
A random sample of bankruptcy files was drawn from the
January-December 1994 files of the Toronto bankruptcy district. This is
a large bankruptcy district that includes Metropolitan Toronto, large
rural areas of Ontario, as well as several Northern Ontario cities. In
1994, this district processed 10,354 consumer bankruptcies and 1,556
business bankruptcies. There were also 253 consumer proposals and 33
commercial proposals.
These bankruptcies represented just under 20 per cent of all
consumer bankruptcies in Canada in 1994. The sample discussed in this
article represents 1,147 cases. I chose 1994 as the sample year so that the
data would reflect experience under the 1992 reforms. In addition, most
cases were completed when I began research in 1997. In drawing the
sample, I excluded corporate bankruptcies, receiverships, and corporate
and consumer proposals, but included all individual bankruptcies. I also
collected basic data from a similar sample in 1997 to permit some
longitudinal comparisons.
For statistical reporting purposes, the OSB divides individual
bankruptcies into consumer and business bankruptcies, with a consumer
bankruptcy defined as one where business debts are less than 50 per cent
of total debts outstanding. I coded the recorded percentages in the files
so that, in addition to analysis of the full sample of individual
bankruptcies, I could analyze the consumer cases where business debts
were less than fifty per cent, and also bankruptcies where the bankruptcy
was coded as relating solely to consumer debt (n=956). It became clear
during the file analysis that current official classifications of consumer
and business'bankruptcy underestimate substantially the number of

46 See Schwartz, supra note 6.
47 See I.D.C. Ramsay, File Study (1998) [unpublished, on file with author] [hereinafter File
Study]. The tables produced below are based on the data from the File Study, unless otherwise
indicated.
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business-related bankruptcies, with significant numbers of "consumer"
bankruptcies being related to business failures.48
There were three main sources of data in the files: (1) the
Statement of Affairs drawn up at the time of filing for bankruptcy; (2) a
report prepared by the trustee shortly before the discharge of the
bankrupt; and (3) the Statement of Receipts and Disbursements, which
is filed by the trustee with the Superintendent of Bankruptcy prior to the
trustee being discharged. There were also data on the Estate
Information Summary, which notes whether the bankruptcy is classified
by the OSB as consumer or business. I collected over 300 variables from
these sources.
The question of the reliability of the data in the Statement of
Affairs concerning the assets and liabilities of a debtor has been raised.
The Statement of Affairs is a sworn statement under oath by the
bankrupt of his or her assets and liabilities, and failure to name a
creditor or declare an asset could constitute a bankruptcy offence. These
data are normally entered at the time of the declaration of bankruptcy
by the bankrupt, almost always in consultation with the trustee. The
exact amount of all debts owed may not be known at the time, and there
may be some errors in the amount of debt. A few trustees appear to
enter nominal amounts simply to indicate that a debt may be owing to a
particular creditor, although the exact amount is not known. Table 20,
below, indicates that, in general, there is a "shrinkage" in the amount of
unsecured debts between the declaration of bankruptcy and the
conclusion of the bankruptcy, when the trustee files the Statement of
Receipts and Disbursements. This may be accounted for partly by the
fact that creditors may fail to prove their claims in bankruptcy. It is
unlikely that the data sources are seriously misleading as to the state of a
debtor's assets at the time of bankruptcy. It is difficult for debtors to
conceal assets of any substantial nature, and interviews with trustees
suggested that this was unlikely to occur. Taking into account these
caveats, I think that these public sources of data are important sources
of information on the asset and liability position of debtors.
The sample is not a national representative sample of bankrupts,
nor a representative sample of all Ontario bankrupts, and the
comparisons with the general population must be treated with caution.
A focus on one large district permitted me to explore files in depth, and
to develop an understanding of the limits and potential of the data in the
files. I draw attention to some of these in relation to such questions as

48 See Table 14, below.
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home-ownership 49 among bankrupts and the amounts of secured debt
owing by bankrupts.50 In a large and regionally diverse country like
Canada, the economic cycle is often at different stages in different
regions of the country, so regional analyses are an important part of
understanding the role of bankruptcy against the background of
particular regional economies.
A. Socio-economic Demography of Bankrupts
In this section, I present data from the file study, and I refer also
to certain other studies. These include two unpublished studies, a
database compiled by the OSB, 51 and a study of debt counselling by David
Forde and Lance Roberts, 52 as well as the more recent study by Schwartz
and Anderson 53 I also make occasional reference to trustee interviews,
which are part of a separate study of the role of trustees in individual
bankruptcies based on interviews with trustees.54
1. Age
The median age was 37, with a mean of 38.5.55 The largest
cluster of bankrupts falls within the 30-39 age band, and this group is
over-represented compared to the general population. For many

49

See Part III(B), below.

50

See Table 11; and Part III(E)(1), below.

51 See Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Three Year Review (1993) [unpublished, on

file with author] [hereinafter Three Year Review]. This is a sample of about 500 cases across Canada
in 1993, which was made available to me by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. It is not
clear how the cases were sampled.
52 See D. Forde & L. Roberts, A NationalAssessment of Bankruptcy Counselling Services

(1994) [unpublished, on file with author]. This is an unpublished study of bankruptcy counselling,
prepared for the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, that collected selected data on the
demographic characteristics of bankrupts.
53 See Schwartz & Anderson, supra note 45.

54 This study involves qualitative data obtained from detailed interviews with trustees. I have
used the study by Jean Braucher of consumer bankruptcy lawyers in the United States as the
reference point for developing this aspect of the research: see Braucher, supra note 43.
55 These data are similar to the Three Year Review, except in relation to debtors under 30 (25
per cent were 20-30; 61.9 per cent were 30-50; 13 per cent were over 50): see Three Year Review,
supranote 51.
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households, this is a time in the life-cycle associated with major credit
commitments to build up a stock of assets.
TABLE 1*
AGE

Age

File Study (%)

Ontario (%)t

18-29

18.9

23.5

30-39
40-49
50-59
60+

39.8
27.7
10.3
3.2
100.0

23.5
18.8
12.6
21.3
100.0

n=1,141; missing=6

* Percentages may not add to 100 per cent due to rounding.

t Statistics Canada, Annual DemographicStatistics (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1994) at 98-99.

2. Gender
There were 55.6 per cent male and 44.4 per cent 'female
bankrupts, compared with 49.4 per cent males and 50.6 per cent females
in the general population.5 6 My findings indicate a large increase in
female filers since the study by Brighton and Connidis in 1977, in which
there were 27 per cent single female filings and 6 per cent joint filings.57
Their findings were in turn a large increase over studies in the early
1970s, which indicated that debtors under the Quebec Lacombe Law
were 83.6 per cent male.S8
Table 2, below, shows that 55 per cent of bankrupts were married
or in a common- law relationship. 59 Marital status varied with age so that
only 40 per cent of those in the 18-29 category were married and 40 per
cent were single. In contrast, of those aged between 30-39 and 40-49, 56
per cent and 60 per cent, respectively, were married or living common

56 See Statistics Canada, Annual Demographic Statistics (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1994)
[hereinafter Annual Demographics].

57 See Brighton & Connidis, supranote 11 at 19.
58 See note 27, supra, and accompanying text.
59 There was therefore a higher percentage of married bankrupts than in the Three Year

Review data (44 per cent), although a similar profile emerges when common-law relationships are
included (7.8 per cent): see Three Year Review, supranote 51.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

37 NOS.

I

&2

law. The much higher general rate of divorced individuals among the
bankruptcy population (10.1 per cent), compared with the general
population of Ontario (5.3 per cent), 60 may not be surprising given the
potential financial problems associated with marital breakdown. Again,
there were differences in divorce rates associated with different age
bands. The divorce and separation rate was highest among those
bankrupts between 40-49 and 50-59, where 30 per cent and 31 per cent
of individuals, respectively, fell within this category. However, as I
indicate later (see Table "14, below), it is rare that marital breakdown
alone is a cause of bankruptcy, and it is generally the combination of
marital breakdown with other factors-such as unemployment-that
triggers bankruptcy.
TABLE 2
MARITAL STATUS
Status
Married
Single
Widowed
Separated
Divorced
Common Law
Total
n=1,134; missing= 13

Per Cent
50.6
18.3
0.9
15.2
10.1
4.9
100.0

3. Dependants
Forty-seven per cent of bankrupts who were married or living in
a common-law relationship had two or more dependants under 21. In
the single bankruptcy population, 27 per cent of women (n=94) had one
or more dependant, compared with only 5 per cent of single men
(n= 112).

60 SeeAnnual Demographics, supra note 56 at 98-99. The "married" category in the Statistics
Canada data includes those who are legally married and separated, and persons living in commonlaw unions. In 1994, 65 per cent of the Ontario population aged 18-64 were married. Twenty-seven
per cent of individuals were single and 1.7 per cent were widowed.
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4. Income
The data on bankrupts' income and expenses were obtained
from the Statement of Affairs, which requires bankrupts to provide their
net income, contributions by dependants, other sources of income, and
the total monthly net household income at the time of declaring
bankruptcy. The median, monthly household net income was $1,700.
Almost 6 per cent of households reported a total net income of zero. It is
possible to obtain annual income data by multiplying these data by
twelve, although it should be mentioned that this involves rather strong
assumptions about the continuity of employment among a group that
appears subject to income interruptions.
TABLE 3
TOTAL MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Income ($)

Per Cent

0
1-999

1,000-1,999
2,000-2,999
3,000-3,999
Total
Median
n=1,142; missing=5

5.9
13.7

44.6
31.4
4.5
100.0
$1,700.0

The bankrupts in the sample differ markedly from the general
Ontario population in 1994 (see Table 4, below). The median after-tax
income in Ontario was $34,561, compared with $20,400 for the bankrupt
population. Less than five per cent of bankrupts had an annual net
household income of more than $50,000. The Low Income Cut-Offs
(Licos) used by Statistics Canada are a widely used measure of poverty in
Canada.61 In 1994, the cut-off for a family of four was a gross income of
$30,708 in cities of 500,000 or more, $26,348 for a community between
30,000 and 90,000, and $20,905 for rural areas. 62 Preliminary analysis of
a sub-sample of bankrupts shows that a large percentage would fall

61 For a useful discussion of the different measures of poverty in 1994, see National Council of

Welfare, Poverty Profile 1994 (Ottawa: National Council of Welfare, 1996).
62

1bid. at5.
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below the poverty line at the time of bankruptcy. Forty per cent of single
bankrupts in Metropolitan Toronto (n=132; with a total monthly
household income less than $1,002, where the poverty line for a single
person is $15,479) would fall below the poverty line for urban centres
with a population of over 500,000, as would a similar percentage of
married couples in Toronto with two dependants under 21 (n=49; with a
total household monthly income of $1,710 or less). These findings
compare with a 14 per cent poverty rate for all persons in Ontario in
1994.63
TABLE 4*
TOTAL ANNUAL NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Income Cs)

File Study (%)

Ontario1994 (%)t

0-9,999

15.1

5.9

10,000-19,999

33.8

18.5

29.2
12.9
4.3
2.3
0.8
0.9
100.0
$20,400.0

17.9
16.3
13.4
9.9
6.8
11.4
100.0
$34,561.0

20,000-29,999
30,000-39,999
40,000-49,999
50,000-59,999
60,000-69,999
70,000+
Total
Median
n=1,142; missing=5

* Percentages may not add to 100 per cent due to rounding.

"Statistics Canada, Income After Tax, Distributionsby Size in Canada(Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
1994) at 79.

The Statement of Affairs requires debtors to indicate the sources
of their income. In addition to contributions from dependants, there is a
column for "other" income. One-half (50 per cent) of the debtors had
other income, which included private sources such as rental income,
commissions, or support payments. More frequently, other income
included public sources, such as unemployment insurance payments
(now known as Employment Insurance payments), social assistance,
child tax benefits, pensions, family allowances, disability benefits, and
workers' compensation. In those cases where there was other income,
the median amount was $800, and the mean was $897 per month. For

63

Ibid. at 20.
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43.5 per cent of those in receipt of other income (n=246), it constituted
their total household income. Larger percentages of women (58 per
cent) than men (46 per cent) received other income. The percentages of
bankrupts receiving some form of public support or insurance at the
time of bankruptcy appears to be much higher than in the general
population. 64
5. Surplus income
Bankrupts must indicate on the Statement of Affairs whether
there is a surplus or deficit in relation to the calculation of their monthly
income and expenses. The majority of debtors showed a deficit at the
time of bankruptcy, and almost 25 per cent had a deficit of over $400.
Less than one-third of the sample had surplus income at the time of
declaring bankruptcy. Of those who had a surplus (n=332), the mean
surplus was $212 and the median was $105. Seventy-seven debtors had a
surplus income of more than $300, comprising just over 6 per cent of the
total sample.
TABLE 5
SURPLUS INCOME
Amount of Surplus ($)
1-99
100-199
200-299
300-399
400+
Total
n=332

64 See Schwartz, supra note 6 at 101.

Per Cent
49.4
15.7
11.7
7.5
15.7
100.0
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6. Debt-to-income ratios
Debt-to-income ratios provide a rough guide of the extent of
debtor difficulties.65 These ratios represent the aggregate debts of the
bankrupt divided by the total annual net income. The median total debtto-income ratio was 2.14, and the median ratio when mortgage debt is
excluded was 1.22. Although Canadians have high levels of debt-todisposable income, the median non-mortgage debt-to-income ratio of
bankrupts was over five times higher than that of the general population
in 1994 (0.19 per cent). The total debt-to-income ratio was over twice
the level among the general population (0.92 in 1994). The nonmortgage debt-to-income ratio is misleadingly high due to reporting
practices in relation to secured and unsecured debt on the Statements of
Affairs.66 However, the general conclusion must be that bankrupts are
carrying large debt burdens in relation to their incomes.
7. Employment status
At the time of filing for bankruptcy, only 63 per cent of debtors
indicated that they were employed, 31 per cent indicated that they were
unemployed, and 6 per cent were retired, students, disabled, or classified
themselves as home-makers. The unemployment rate in Ontario in 1992
and 1993 was 10.9 per cent and 10.6 per cent, respectively, and in 1994 it
was 9.6 per cent. 67 These findings underline the importance of
interruptions in employment among bankrupts, a finding confirmed by
other studies in Canada and the United States. 68

65 The use of debt-to-income ratios is discussed by G.B. Canner, A.B. Kennickell & C.A.
Luckett, "Household Sector Borrowing and the Burden of Debt" (1995) Fed. Res. Bull. 323.
66 See Table 20, below.
67 See Statistics Canada, CanadianEconomic Observer: StatisticalSupplement-January1996
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1996) at 59, Table 40.
68 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook indicated only a 7 per cent unemployment rate in their
American study, but these data are complicated by the fact that, in considering employment status
only, the "primary debtor" was considered in joint petitions: see As We Forgive Our Debtors, supra
note 34 at 85. Data from their 1991 study indicate that in 52 per cent of all cases petitioners
reported a period of unemployment for themselves, their spouses, or both during the two years
before filing: see "Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later," supra note 34 at 131.

1999]

A Socio-LegalAnalysis

8. Self-employed and in business
Twenty-eight per cent of debtors 'described themselves as selfemployed, and 24 per cent indicated that they had been in business
during the five years prior to their bankruptcy. In Ontario, 13.7 per cent
of the labour force was self-employed in 1994,69 underlining the high
rate of representation of this group within the bankruptcy population.
9. Occupation
Occupation is a commonly used indicator of social class. There
are several reasons why it is important to understand the relationship
between the use of bankruptcy and social class. Bankruptcy is a legal
institution and a legal resource. One could draw a rather crude
distinction between the legal process "doing things to people" (e.g., the
criminal process), and providing individuals with resources (e.g., the
introduction of Small Claims Courts). Much research suggests that the
criminal justice process focuses disproportionately on offences
committed by working-class and poor individuals, rather than the crimes
of the powerful, and discriminates against those drawn from minority
groups.70 On the other hand, when the law provides facilities such as
Small Claims Courts, they are colonized by narrow groups of
professionals, small businesses, and the middle classes.7 1 Individual
consumers seem to have obtained, at best, modest benefits from such
institutions. Bankruptcy is an institution that "does things to
people,"--e.g., results in the loss of assets, creates potential stigma, and
so on, but it also provides potential benefits and opportunities through a
"fresh start." Occupational analysis of the users of this process is
therefore an important part of understanding the role of bankruptcy as a
legal institution in contemporary society, how it compares with other
legal institutions, and whether its use should be expanded or restricted.
69 See Statistics Canada, "Ontario-Selected Economic Indicators" (CANSIM) Matrix 9225,
series D28724, online: Statistics Canada <http:llwww.statcan.ca/english/CANSIM> (date accessed:
25 August 1999); and Statistics Canada, "Ontario, Labour Force Characteristics, Three Month

Moving Averages From March 1976, Seasonally Adjusted" (CANSIM) Matrix 3463, series
D983003, online: ibid.

70 See generally Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System,
Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1995) (Co-chairs: D.P. Cole & M. Gittens) c. 4, n. 24, and sources cited therein.
71 See S.C. McGuire & R.A. Macdonald, "Small Claims Courts Cant" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 509.
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I was particularly interested in the occupation of bankrupts
because of the findings of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook that,
although debtors earned significantly less income than the general
population at the time of bankruptcy, debtors' occupations were similar
to the general population, and they worked in roughly the same
industries and jobs. The data on occupation are drawn from the
Statement of Affairs. The entry is often not very specific. For example,
in some cases an entry would simply indicate "Sales" or "Salesman" [sic].
I was able to obtain useable data from 824 cases.
There are a variety of measures of occupational prestige and,
for the purpose of analyzing these data, I used an occupational scale
known as the Pineo-Porter-McRoberts scale,72 as this has been used by
previous bankruptcy studies. Table 6, below, shows the findings on
occupational status, and also those of Forde and Roberts, who collected
occupational data from a national sample of bankrupts in 1994 as part of
a study of debt counselling in bankruptcy. This provides a useful
comparison since the data were collected in the same year as the file
study, but the data were obtained from questionnaires to bankrupts.

72 See P.C. Pineo, J. Porter & H.A. McRoberts, "The 1971 Census and the Socioeconomic
Classification of Occupations" (1977) 14 Can. Rev. Soc. & Anth. 91.
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TABLE 6
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF BANKRUPTS USING THE
PINEO-PORTER-MCROBERTS SCALE

OccupationalCategory

Self-Employed Professional
Employed Professional
High-Level Management
Semi-Professionals
Technicians
Middle Management
Supervisors
Foremen/women
Skilled Clerical/Sales/Service
Skilled Crafts and Trades
Farmer

Semi-Skilled Clerical/Sales/Service
Semi-Skilled Manual
Unskilled Clerical/Sales/Service
Unskilled Manual Labourer
Farm Labour
Total

File
Study(%)

Fordel
Roberts(%)*

Canada
1995(%)t

0.7
4.2
1.9
5.9
1.3
4.9
6.1
1.0
13.8
12.6

0.3
3.1
0.9
6.8
1.7
9.1
2.2
1.7
9.0
12.0

1.3
7.9
3.3
8.8
1.8
9.8
2.2
2.0
7.9
9.9

0

...

15.9
10.6
6.4
14.4
0.1
100.0

19.0
12.4
6.1
14.9
0.9
100.0

1.7

14.3
8.1
7.8
11.7
1.6
100.0

* D. Forde & L. Roberts,A NationalAssessmentof Bankruptcy Counselling Services (Winnipeg:

Sociometrix, 1994)
t Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, Cycle 11: Socialand Community Support (1996) (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 1997).

Table 6 shows that the bankrupts in the sample do not
correspond to a representative cross-sample of the labour force.
However, the discrepancies are larger within different categories. The
top three classes (self-employed professionals, employed professionals,
and high-level management) and middle management are significantly
under-represented among bankrupts, while those in the skilled clerical/
sales/service category are over-represented. The latter category, which
includes such occupations as real estate agents, also had a relatively high
level of self-employment (34 per cent). Among the least qualified groups
(unskilled labourers, unskilled clerical, and farm labour categories),
there are similar percentages of bankrupts compared to the general
population. There are also similar percentages among the semi-skilled
categories. The data from Forde and Roberts indicate that, apart from
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the top three classifications, bankrupts are not greatly dissimilar to the
general population in occupational status.
It should be noted that I did not include in the occupational
analysis the small number of cases of consumer proposals where the
majority of debtors are generally drawn from the skilled trades and
higher occupational categories, and the few cases in which individual
professionals had made commercial proposals. Finally, there are some
cases in the sample about which one could surmise that there had been a
decline in the occupational status of an individual in the period leading
up to bankruptcy. Thus a small business owner might have an
occupational status as a waitress at the time of the bankruptcy.73 It was
not possible to measure the significance of this factor, although this
suggests that the factor should be measured in future studies.
These findings contrast with the 1997 findings of Schwartz and
Anderson that Canadian bankrupts are not a cross-section of the
Canadian population, and that those in the lowest occupational levels
were significantly over-represented. 74 My findings indicate also a
significant change from the 1977 study by Brighton and Connidis, where
there were twice as many unskilled manual labourers among the
bankruptcy population as in the general work force. 75 Both of these
studies used different sampling frames, so that this may be a factor
accounting for the differences between the studies.
Although Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook concluded that
American bankrupts did not differ markedly in occupational prestige
from the general population, their data did indicate a significant underrepresentation in the professional/technical and manager/administrator
classes, and significantly larger percentages of occupations requiring
lower skill levels. 76 When this modification is taken into account-and
recognizing the difficulties of comparing data that use different
occupational coding schemes-their data are not sharply different from
my findings or from those of Forde and Roberts.

73 I am indebted to Jay Westbrook for suggesting the importance of attempting to find this
"occupational decline" in the sample.
74 See Schwartz & Anderson, supra note 45 at 11; and Schwartz, supra note 6 at 101.
75 It may be relevant that the Brighton and Connidis study included as part of the sample
debtors who had declared bankruptcy under the FITA program, which made bankruptcy available to
those who could not afford the services of a private trustee. Although there exists still a pro bono
program for debtors, it is not clear from discussions with trustees that it functions on the same scale
as did the FITA program.
76 See As We Forgive Our Debtors,supra note 34 at 87, Table 5.1.
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A more difficult issue is to interpret the occupational findings in
terms of social class. An initial analysis might be attempted by adopting
a broad-brush classification of contemporary societies as consisting of
four main classes: (1) a professional-business class; (2) a class of smallscale independent business people; (3) a working class with white- and
blue-collar segments; and (4) an underclass. 77 Using this classification, I
would conclude that individual bankrupts are drawn primarily from the
working class and, to a lesser degree, from the category of small-scale
independent business people. The working-class category would include
such categories as skilled and unskilled clerical occupations, sales
occupations, as well as those lower in the occupational scale, such as
supervisors and some semi-professionals.
Michael Adler, in his comments on my Conference paper, made
some very helpful suggestions on further sources for analyzing the
occupational class of bankrupts. 78 In particular, he drew attention to
Will Hutton's analysis of contemporary employment patterns in terms of
risk and insecurity, and the growth of insecurity of employment among a
large percentage of the labour force. 79 The high rate of representation of
self-employed individuals in the sample, and the high levels of
unemployment at the time of bankruptcy, suggest that insecurity of
occupation may be an important factor within the sample. As I indicate
below, few bankrupts have substantial assets to cushion them against
unforeseen circumstances.8 0
Since bankruptcy is part of the process of debt recovery, it might
be useful to compare the occupations of bankrupts with individuals who
have individual debt enforcement action taken against them. There are,
unfortunately, few recent Canadian studies on this question, but the
studies of the 1970s noted in Part II, above, painted a picture of a bluecollar male debtor who was subject to significant income interruptions.
My data suggest that bankrupts are drawn from a wider cross-section of
society than those against whom individual debt action is taken. There is
also an important difference between individual debt enforcement and
bankruptcy. In the former situation, the debtor is usually an involuntary
participant. In contrast, almost every bankruptcy is initiated by the
individual debtor, so that it is a voluntary choice. Although a declaration

77 This classification is suggested by R.M. Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? (New
York: Verso, 1996) at 14.
78 See M. Adler, "Reactions to Empirical Studies" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 127.

79 See W. Hutton, "High Risk Strategy" The [Manchester] Guardian(30 October 1995) 2-2.
80 See discussion in Part Ill(C), below.
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of bankruptcy may often be a response to extreme pressure, it still differs
from the situation in which a creditor enforces a debt against an
individual. This difference means that the bankruptcy choice might be
studied as part of the broader socio-legal literature that studies
individual remedy-seeking, and the use of the legal system and
professionals by individuals. 8 ' Since most studies suggest a reluctance by
individuals to turn to third parties (such as lawyers) for help in relation
to consumer disputes, 82 an important research question is why
individuals do turn to a bankruptcy trustee.
B. Home-ownership
At this point, it is appropriate to consider the issue of homeownership. The purchase of a home requires individuals to pass a
relatively rigorous credit screening, compared with other purchases, so
that home-ownership is often difficult to achieve for those in marginal or
unstable economic circumstances. Twenty-five per cent of debtors listed
a house (real property) as an asset on their Statement of Affairs. There
was geographic variation within the sample of those debtors with a
Toronto postal code having a home-ownership level of 15 per cent.
These data indicate a much smaller percentage of home-owners in the
sample than the general population of Ontario (65 per cent owners),
Canada (64 per cent), or Toronto (58 per cent). 83 Five debtors (0.4 per
cent) owned mobile homes. The median value of the home at the time of
bankruptcy was $109,000.
The data from the Statement of Affairs indicate only those
individual bankrupts who were home-owners at the time of declaring
81 We might compare here the profile of a bankrupt with those individuals who seek the
advice of credit counselling agencies. In 1994, 19,355 individuals sought the advice of credit
counselling agencies in Ontario. Their average gross family income was $26,835, average total debt
was $14,619, and average number of debts was 5.4. These data tell us that bankrupts had higher
levels of debt and similar incomes to individuals visiting counselling agencies. However, further
analysis would be necessary to understand the relationship between the two groups: see Ontario
Association of Credit Counselling Services, Annual Report 1995 (Toronto: Ontario Association of
Credit Counselling Services, 1995).
82 See, for example, N. Vidmar, "Seeking Justice: An Empirical Map of Consumer Problems
and Consumer Responses in Canada" (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 757; and I.D.C. Ramsay,
"Consumer Redress Mechanisms for Defective and Poor-Quality Products" (1981) 31 U.T.L.J. 117.
83 See Statistics Canada, Household Facilities by Income and Other Characteristics,1994
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1994) at 30, 56 [hereinafter Household Facilitiesby Income]; and W.
Baker & B. Herring, with Statistics Canada, PCensus: 1991 Census-Example Lifestyle, Toronto
(Vancouver, B.C.: Tetrad Computer Applications, 1992).
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bankruptcy. They do not tell us about individuals who had their home
seized, or who disposed of it in the period leading up to a declaration of
bankruptcy. Fortunately, the Statement of Affairs requests that the
debtor provide data on assets that have been seized or disposed of in the
period up to five years before the declaration of bankruptcy. Existing
Canadian studies have not incorporated these data into their analyses of
the asset position of a bankrupt. I collected these data and, excluding
those individuals owning homes at the time of bankruptcy, estimate that
20 per cent of debtors had disposed of their homes, or had their home
seized, in the period preceding bankruptcy. This would bring the homeownership level close to the findings of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
in relation to American bankruptcies (who reported a home-ownership
level of 52 per cent, and 7.5 per cent for those owning mobile homes). 84
Assuming that this estimate is correct, it suggests a much higher
home-ownership level for this sample than suggested by other studies. It
is possible that this was an idiosyncratic sample that reflected the real
estate collapse in Ontario in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In addition,
a number of those "owning" homes may have been using them solely as
an investment vehicle, and this may have also boosted the homeownership level. The data from the 1997 files will permit me to test this
hypothesis. However, any study that restricts home-ownership analysis to
ownership at the time of bankruptcy will underestimate those bankrupts
who were home-owners in the period preceding bankruptcy. My findings
are also significant in relation to analysis of the social class of bankrupts.
Previous studies, such as that of Brighton and Connidis, drew attention
to the low levels of home-ownership as one factor in the argument that
bankrupts were drawn from the lower working class or marginal sections
of society. My data indicate that bankrupts may be somewhat closer to a
representative sample of the population, at least in relation to homeownership, than we had previously thought. Home-ownership does not
mean (in Canada) that one is well-off, but might be taken as a signal that
there are a substantial number of bankrupts who are not drawn from an
underclass or marginal social group.
I have not completed analysis of the mortgage levels of the
home-owners, but it would appear that, in the majority of these cases,
the first mortgage exceeded the value of the property as recorded on the
Statement of Affairs. In addition, there were 91 home-owners with
second mortgages, 14 with a third mortgage, and 3 with a fourth

84 SeeAs We Forgive Our Debtors,supra note 34 at 129.
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mortgage.S5 Many bankrupt home-owners faced the problem of
"negative equity" in their home.
Bankruptcy appears to be one method of addressing the problem
of negative equity, and any deficiency judgment that results from a
creditor exercising its power of sale if an individual defaults on
repayments. Significant numbers of home-owning bankrupts appeared to
have large deficiencies that would be discharged as unsecured debt in
the bankruptcy process.8 6 In some Western provinces, debtors are
protected against deficiency judgments so that the creditor must look
solely to the collateral for satisfaction of the debt.
It appears that a number of bankrupts were able to remain in
their homes, notwithstanding the bankruptcy. On a number of the
Statements of Trustees' Receipts and Disbursements it was noted
specifically that the debtor was continuing to pay the mortgage, and
remained in the home. Bankruptcy may help a debtor to remain in his or
her home since, having discharged unsecured debt in the bankruptcy, the
debtor is in a better position to pay the mortgage. Paradoxically, the
debtor with no equity in the home may be in a better position than one
with equity, since the latter would have to pay the trustee to release the
trustees' interest in the home. The use of bankruptcy as a device to stay
in the home is also fraught with difficulty, since an over-optimistic
debtor who remains in the home through the bankruptcy, and then is
subsequently unable to repay, will lose his or her home, and be faced
with a deficiency judgment.
The findings on the extent of home-ownership among bankrupts
suggest that greater attention should be paid to the relationship between
bankruptcy and housing law and policy, particularly the causal link
between mortgage debt and bankruptcy. This might include the role of
interest rate spikes, and the unwillingness of lenders to renew first or
second mortgages. (Most home mortgages in Canada are for terms no
longer than five years.)
Finally, there is the normative issue of how much protection
should be provided to home-owners in bankruptcy. To the extent that
Canada has had a housing policy, a central plank has been the
promotion of home-ownership as the primary means of tenure, even for
individuals of modest means. Rental housing is a secondary form of
tenure, and there is little public housing. Home-ownership is both an
investment and a way of life. As an investment, it is for many individuals
85 It is possible that some of these mortgages related to the small number of home-owners
who also owned a cottage (9) or land (4).
86 See Table 14, below.
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the most important method of saving for their retirement. In addition,
the loss of a home is not merely a material loss, but may be the loss of a
way of life. One trustee expressed this very vividly:
You have to realize that from the viewpoint of the [bankrupt] I'm not talking of a house.

I am talking a whole way of life. I'm talking of a whole way of living. I am suggesting they
should change their way of living ... . [T]he house is where the children have their friends,

where their children go to school, where the woman, if she's not working, has her social
contacts, where they have their neighbours. It's not the house, it's the whole way of life,

I'm talking about.

87

In any political decision on the extent of protection for homeowners, it is necessary to balance the social costs of losing a home
against the argument that, if there are restrictions on seizure of this
asset, then there may be less credit available to marginal credit risks. The
extent of this impact is an empirical question, but some research suggests
that existing restrictions on mortgage repossession rights have a
relatively modest impact on credit price and availability.88
C. The Structure ofAssets and Liabilities
The data presented here are drawn from the Statement of
Affairs, and the report filed by the trustee shortly before discharge under
section 170 of the BIA. In the Statement of Affairs, the trustee or debtor
inserts the value of the debtor's assets under a number of headings,
including cash; furniture; personal effects; cash surrender value of life
insurance policies; stocks; real property including cottages and land;
automobiles, motorcycles, snowmobiles, and recreational equipment;
estimated tax refunds; tools of the trade; and other assets. Debtors are
entitled to retain certain assets, and under the BiA these exemptions are
determined by reference to the relevant provincial legislation. The
exemptions in Ontario are modest, including $2,000 for furniture and
household goods; $1,000 for the "necessary and ordinary wearing
apparel" of the debtor; and for tools and chattels (such as an
automobile) ordinarily used in the debtor's business, profession, or

87

Trustee Interview #12 (29 June 1998) [on file with author].

88 For a discussion of the impact of protective provincial legislation, see Alberta Law Reform
Institute, Mortgage Remedies in Alberta (Edmonton: Alberta Law Reform Institute, 1994); and M.H.

Schill, "An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws" (1991) 77 Va. L. Rev. 489 at 491:
"home mortgage loan interest rates are relatively insensitive to the existence of mortgagor

protection laws."
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calling, up to $2,000.89 There is the possibility of an exemption for
Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPS), provided they are
associated with a life insurance policy.9 0 There is no home or homestead
exemption, contrasting with Western provinces such as Alberta, which
has the most liberal exemption in Canada ($40,000).91
Table 7, below, reflects the value of assets without deducting for
mortgages or other forms of security. The majority of bankrupts have
assets valued at less than $5,000 at the time of bankruptcy, and about 37
per cent have assets less than the provincial ceiling on furniture of
$2,000. The majority of individuals with assets over $20,000 are
represented by home-owners, and it must be remembered that this asset
will often be fully mortgaged. It is clear that debtors, at the time of
bankruptcy, have few assets to turn over to their creditors.
TABLE 7
TOTAL ASSETS

89

Assets ($)

PerCent

0
1-1,000
1,001-2,000
2,001-5,000
5,001-10,000
10,001-20,000
20,001-50,000
50,001-100,000
100,001-200,000
200,000+
Total
n=1,143; missing=4

10.6
16.9
14.4
18.9
7.0
4.8
2.9
8.0
12.9
3.6
100.0

See ExecutionAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. E-24, s. 2.

90 For further discussion on the complexities in relation to the eligibility of RRSPS, see L.W.
Houlden & G.B. Morawetz, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, vol. 1, 3d ed., looseleaf
(Toronto: Carswell, 1998) at F§42.
91 See Civil Enforcement Regulation, Alta. Reg. 276/95, s. 37(1)(e).
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1. Automobile ownership
Forty-seven per cent of bankrupts owned at least one
automobile. This is significantly less than the general population in
which 77 per cent of Ontario households owned one or more
automobiles in 1994.92 The Ontario data do not provide an exact
comparison since they relate to household rather than individual
ownership, and it is possible that a partner of a bankrupt might own an
automobile. There was a higher level of ownership among males (53 per
cent) compared with females (43 per cent), and single women had the
lowest level at 29 per cent. In 44 per cent of cases where a bankrupt
owned an automobile it was partially or totally secured. It is possible
that, in these cases, a bankrupt might be able to retain the automobile by
continuing to pay the secured lender. The median exchange value of the
automobile was $1,000, and $3,500 in those cases where the automobile
was secured.
Under the Ontario Execution Act, automobiles are exempt, up to
a value of $2,000, as tools of the trade if they are "ordinarily used by the
debtor in the debtor's business, profession, or calling." 93 In only 25 per
cent of cases where an individual owned one automobile was it classified
as exempt, and in only 16 per cent of cases (17 out of 105) was the
second automobile exempt. Interviews with trustees suggest that a
debtor may be able to retain an automobile as exempt if the trustee
takes a liberal (versus a strict) approach to the interpretation of the
"tools of the trade" exemption.
2. Furniture and personal effects
Only 760 debtors reported a positive value for furniture, and
almost 99 per cent of debtors listed a value of $2,000 or less. Of the 1.3
per cent over $2,000, several cases were joint filings, so that the asset
levels reflected the exemptions for two people. It is therefore extremely
rare for any bankrupt to have furniture valued at over the personal
exemption limit. A similar pattern may be found in relation to personal
effects (see Table 9, below).

92 See Household Facilitiesby Income, supra note 83 at 56.
93

Execution Act, supranote 89, s. 2(3).
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TABLE 8
FURNITURE

Value ($)

Per Cent

0
1-500
501-1,000
1,001-1,500
1,501-2,000
$2000+
Total
n=1;141 missing=6

33.4
11.8
19.1
9.1
25.2
1.3
100.0

TABLE 9
PERSONAL EFFECTS
Value ($)
0-249
250-499
500-749
750-999
1,000+
Total
n=1,138; missing=9

Per Cent
65.4
10.2
1.9
21.0
1.5
100.0

These data reflect the fact that, in the trustee's view, the
exchange value of household goods is small and that, given the
additional costs of realization, it is not worthwhile to attempt to realize
on these assets. In interviews with trustees, there was near unanimity in
their view that debtors would rarely have goods within this category
worth realizing. Sample comments included:
It would be a very rare situation that I would have somebody to go value something in
somebody's house. 94
So what I'll say to them is-they're sitting opposite me-if you had a garage sale
tomorrow and you put all your belongings on your lawn, what would you get? And if
95
anybody could say they would get more than $2,000, I think they're wrong.

94

Trustee Interview #3 (4 July 1997) [on file with author].
95 Trustee Interview #5 (October 1996) [on file with author].
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Do you have ... antiques? Did you just refurnish? Do you have expensive stereo
equipment? If they answer no to all these, then we just put in a Statement of Affairs that

they have household furniture anywhere up to $2,000. ... I can't think of a time when we
have had to actually get an appraisal.

96

3. Stocks, RRSPs, and life insurance policies
Thirteen per cent of bankrupts owned stocks (n= 150) at the time
of declaring bankruptcy, and this was usually held in the form of an RRSP.
The median value for those with stocks was $1,650 (mean $7,349), with
25 per cent owning stocks valued at more than $7,000. The report made
by the trustee shortly before discharge indicated that 87 debtors held a
RRSP with a median value of $2,200 (mean $6,334), and in 27 cases these
were classified as exempt from seizure. 97 Less than 3 per cent of debtors
(14) indicated a cash surrender value for a life insurance policy as an
asset. More men than women held stocks or RRSPS (61 per cent to 39 per
cent). Those in the top three occupational categories were overrepresented in ownership of these assets, while those in the unskilled
occupational categories were under-represented in stocks and RRSP
ownership. It is difficult to obtain accurate data on the percentage of
households in the general population that own RRSPS, mutual funds, and
stocks. A well-known investment firm estimates that perhaps 30-40 per
cent of households owned mutual funds in 199798 and, in 1995, 35 per
cent of all eligible tax filers made a contribution to an RRSP.9 9 Even if
some bankrupts may have liquidated their holdings before bankruptcy,
there is an under-representation of ownership of these assets by
bankrupts.
In relation to other categories of assets, 12 debtors owned a
motorcycle; 6 owned a snowmobile; 51 owned tools of the trade with a
median value of $1,000; 12 owned land with a median value of $47,500;
98 had cash (median of $250); and 13 had other assets (median value of
$600).

96 Trustee Interview #16 (9 January 1997) [on file with author].
97 In Ontario, an

RRSP

will be exempt from seizure if it is in a plan associated with a life

insurance policy that designates irrevocably certain family members as beneficiaries.
98 See G. Stromberg, Investment Funds in Canada and Consumer Protection:"Strategiesfor the

Millennium:A Review (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1998) at 3, where the author cites to information
provided by C.I.B.C. Wood Gundy.
99 See The CanadianYear Book (Toronto: A. Hewett, 1999) at 194.
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Bankruptcy is based on the concept of the bankrupt turning over
his or her non-exempt assets to creditors in return for receiving a
discharge of his or her debts. My findings are that few individual
bankrupts have any substantial assets at the time of bankruptcy to turn
over to their general creditors.
4. Human capital: income contributions
One significant finding is that a majority of debtors made income
contributions to the estate while they were undischarged bankrupts,
notwithstanding the fact that in 1994 post-bankruptcy income did not
automatically fall into the estate. These payments were usually based on
a formal or informal arrangement with the trustee, and may require
monthly payments by the debtor. The trustees' Statements of Receipts
and Disbursements indicated that in 782 cases (from a possible base of
973 completed cases; see Table 18, below) where such a payment was
made, the median amount was $936. These income contributions are,
apart from income tax refunds, the most significant "asset" that most
debtors will contribute to the estate. They are also the most substantial
part of the trustee's "fee" for processing the bankruptcy. The question
might be asked, how are individuals able to find the income to make
these payments, given their parlous financial state? In some cases the
payments may be contributed by relatives. In addition, it must be
remembered that because a declaration of bankruptcy stays enforcement
action by unsecured creditors, a debtor will be able to divert any income
being used to pay these debts into payments to the estate.
These income payments undermine a sharp distinction that is
sometimes drawn between a "straight bankruptcy," where individuals
turn over their assets, and a proposal, in which a debtor retains assets
but makes income repayments. Most debtors in straight bankruptcies
have no assets to make available to their creditors, but will be attempting
to make income repayments during the period of nine months in which
they are undischarged bankrupts.
D. Assets and Exemptions
Exemptions of certain property from seizure are a central aspect
of the "fresh start" in bankruptcy, and the rationales for exemptions are
those of minimum economic security, welfare substitution, and family
values. The last objective has been stressed in recent Supreme Court of
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Canada cases, and mirrors the growth of a privatization rhetoric that
stresses individual rather than communal responsibility. 100
In Royal Bank, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada
considered the case of a medical doctor who had transferred assets from
an RRSP into a Registered Retirement Investment Fund (R1F), and
whether this was a void settlement under section 91(2) of the BJA. 10 1 In
protecting this asset from seizure, the Court stressed the importance of
this exemption as a method of ensuring that the bankrupt could provide
for the welfare of his dependants. There is a sharp difference between
the picture of the bankrupt in this case and that of the sample. Selfemployed professionals constitute under 1 per cent of the sample. Few
bankrupts have assets, such as RRsPs or RRIFS, that they can shield from
their creditors to provide for their families. Yet the absence of
protection for an automobile, except in the narrow circumstances
defined by the Execution Act, means that unemployed bankrupts may be
disadvantaged in seeking employment, and may face high substitution
costs (such as taxis) to commute to work, obtain groceries, and transport
children. The absence of significant public transportation outside the
Greater Toronto Area underlines this problem.
E. Liabilities
I collected data on outstanding debts from the Statement of
Affairs, the section 170 report, 0 2 and the trustees' Statement of
Receipts and Disbursements. Over 40 per cent of bankrupts had total
liabilities less than $30,000, and almost one-third had liabilities over
$100,000, which is represented primarily by mortgage debt. There were
differences in liabilities within the sample, depending on whether a
bankrupt was classified as a business bankruptcy (business debt more
than fifty per cent of total liabilities), or was a "pure consumer" debtor

100 See, for example, Royal Bank, supra note 10; and Marzetti v. Marzetti, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 765,
lacobucci J. There is often a connection between welfare substitution and family values. Writers
have pointed to the trend towards privatization of welfare, where individuals are held responsible
for assuring the welfare of themselves and their families.

101 See Royal Bank, supra note 10.
102 Section 170(1) of the mA, supra note 2, states that a trustee shall prepare a report on (1)
the affairs of the bankrupt; (2) the causes of his or her bankruptcy; (3) the manner in which the
bankrupt has performed the duties imposed on him or her under the Act or court orders; (4)
whether the bankrupt has been convicted of any offence under the Act; and (5) any other facts or
circumstances that would justify the court's refusal of an unconditional order of discharge.
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(classified by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy as a bankruptcy where
none of the debts relate to the operation of a business).
TABLE 10
TOTAL LIABILITIES: ALL DEBTORS, CONSUMER DEBTORS,
AND BUSINESS DEBTORS
All Debtors

Mean
Median
Std. Deviation
25th Percentile
75th Percentile
n=

134,067
41,363
573,402
16,868
137,825
1,136
missing= 11

Pure Consumer($)

Business($)

86,943
32,649
165,235
15,001
114,419
946
missing= 10

497,757
118,500
1,790,414
38,786
360,310
101

Table 10, above, highlights the contrast between consumer
bankrupts with a relatively modest median level of debt, and individual
business bankrupts with a much higher level of debt. The absolute level
of debt for many bankrupts may not seem high. For example, 10 per cent
of bankrupts have less than $10,000 in total outstanding debts. Analysis
of this sub-group (n=115) shows a high level of unemployment (over 50
per cent), low levels of household income, and almost one-third drawn
from the unskilled labour occupations. There were almost equal
numbers of male and female debtors within this category. It is therefore
the relative level of debt-to-income and future occupational prospects
that is of crucial importance in the bankruptcy decision.
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TABLE 11
TOTAL LIABILITIES BROKEN DOWN BY CREDITOR TYPE AND
SECURITY HELD AT THE TIME OF BANKRUPTCY

Creditor
Banks
Trust Cos.
Finance Cos.
Auto Finance Cos.
Auto Lease
Other Lease
Credit Union
Mortgage Cos.
All Purpose
Credit Card

Total ($)

Secured ($)

Unsecured ($)

54,462,938
22,223,308
10,221,073
1,148,901
602,753
637,556
1,478,879
8,205,970

31,696,276
12,409,820
2,099,604
476,939
207,570
22,801
281,772
4,771,087

22,530,052
9,813,488
8,121,469
671,962
395,183
614,755
1,197,107
3,727,910

4,954,579

...

4,954,579

2,158,097
6,142, 731
4,168,957

...
...

2,158,097
6,142,732

Retail/Gas
Credit Card
Stores
Insurance Cos.*

Caisse Populaire

425,379

158,600

266,779

Collection Agency
Landlord

145,286
63,038

...
...

145,286
63,038

1,869,440
670,130
8,928,044
954,759
450,278
1,020,959
133,477
300,498
1,596,619

...
...
...
...

1,869,440
670,130
8,928,044
954,759
450,278
1,020,959
133,477
300,498
1,596,619

Professional Services
Legal/Medical
Other Professionals
Revenue Canada
Student Loan
Municipality
Goods & Services Tax
Employment Insurance
Utilities
Other Government

Litigation Judgment
Individuals*
Others*
Total

2,344,484
12,254,751
4,692,758
152,255,642

...

...
...
...
...

...
......
......
52,124,469

2,344,484

79,071,125

* The breakdown of secured and unsecured claims are not known for the cases of insurance
companies, individuals, and others.

Table 11, above, indicates the breakdown of debts by creditor
type, and also indicates the extent to which creditors held security over
the assets of the debtor at the time of bankruptcy. Debts owed to
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financial institutions represent over two-thirds of total debt
outstanding1 03 Government debts constitute just under 10 per cent of
total debts, with Revenue Canada the largest government creditor. If
one scans the creditors in descending order, there is a broad distinction
between the professional creditors (at the top), which calculate and
04
spread risks on an aggregate basis, and the "reluctant" creditors
(further down), such as professionals, landlords, government agencies,
and those with litigation judgments against the bankrupt. There is also a
large amount of outstanding debt owing to "individuals." This category
was sometimes difficult to code in the field work, but appears to include
both private lenders and others such as friends or relatives.
1. Secured credit and debt
An important method of reducing risk for a creditor is to take
security over the assets of a debtor. My initial analysis of the Statement
of Affairs suggested that 42 per cent of debtors have secured debt. This
was similar to the OSB data, which had also used the Statement of Affairs
as a data source.OS These findings contrast with American studies, which06
generally show a high level of secured debt among bankrupts.1
However, I soon discovered that reliance on the presentation of secured
and unsecured debt in the Statement of Affairs, without further analysis,
underestimates the amount of secured debt. This is because of the
reporting system on the Statement of Affairs where debts are reported
as secured or unsecured. The Statement of Affairs will reveal those
creditors who are partially secured, but it will not indicate whether a
debt, recorded as unsecured, is in fact a deficiency claim on a secured
asset. Other sources in the files may not always reveal these data. It is
not easy to provide a precise percentage of the amount of debt originally
secured. I think (based partly on clear indications in the files and
educated estimates) that at least 70 per cent of files will have claims that
were originally secured. Table 11 shows that many financial creditors are

103 In 1994, banks held 65 per cent of the consumer credit market, finance companies and
credit unions each held 9 per cent, and trust and mortgage loan companies held 6 per cent: see
Bank of Canada, Bank of CanadaReview (Ottawa: Bank of Canada, 1994).
104 See discussion of reluctant creditors in As We Forgive Our Debtors, supra note 34 at 293.
105 See Three Year Review, supra note 51.
106 See, for example,As We Foigive Our Debtors,supra note 34 at 307, Table 17.2, which shows
that 70 per cent of the debts listed in bankruptcy were secured.
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under-secured at the time of the bankruptcy, with the banks being the
least under-secured.
2. Specific debts
a) Banks and otherfinancialinstitutions
In 58 per cent of cases, individuals owed at least one debt to a
chartered bank. The median liability for bank debts, where the value was
known at the time of bankruptcy (n=693), was $14,500 (with a mean of
$82,195). There was a large variation here, with 25 per cent owing less
than $5,000 and 25 per cent owing more than $70,500. Bank debt
constituted, on average, 36 per cent of total liabilities, and in 25 per cent
of cases represented 75 per cent or more of total liabilities.
Sixty per cent of debtors owed debts to other financial
institutions, and of those cases where the debt was known at the time of
bankruptcy, the median amount was $15,700 and the mean $71,604.
Debts to financial institutions (excluding credit cards and retail debts)
were owed by debtors in 83 per cent of cases. Thus, in 17 per cent of
cases individuals had no debts to financial institutions.
b) Credit card debts
Credit card debts included debts owing on general purpose
cards, retail credit cards, and gas credit cards. Eighty-one per cent of
bankrupts owed debts on credit cards, with debtors having an average
(median) of three cards at the time of bankruptcy. The mean debt
outstanding was $7,615 and the median was $4,800. Twenty-two per cent
owed more than $10,000 on credit cards. I coded the general credit card
debt (such as Visa and Mastercard) separately from retail credit card
debt and gas credit card debt. Almost two-thirds of bankrupts owed
money on a retail credit card (60 per cent), with a median debt of $1,857
outstanding. The interest rate on unpaid retail credit cards may often be
close to 30 per cent, so that any outstanding debt may cumulate quickly
if it is not paid on time. Data provided by the Canadian Bankers
Association shows that there were 35.2 million Visa and Mastercard
credit cards in circulation in October 1998, and that 45 per cent of these
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cards were carrying outstanding balances. 107 A survey in 1997 indicated
that 74 per cent of Canadians own a bank credit card and 52 per cent
own a department store credit card.108 There is not a large difference in
general credit card ownership between bankrupts and the general
population, although almost 10 per cent more bankrupts own a retail
credit card.
There has been much discussion of the role of credit card debt in
relation to bankruptcy. 109 The file study shows that the actual amounts
owing on credit card debt are not large in absolute terms and that total
credit card debt represents a small percentage of total debt outstanding.
However, we do not know the extent to which credit card debt may
trigger a bankruptcy because of the high interest charges on overdue
accounts. We might estimate that credit cards are the last source of
unsecured credit for both individual business and consumer bankrupts,
and it is probably this phenomenon that has stimulated claims by
creditors and their representatives that debtors "run up" large credit
card debt just before bankruptcy.
Twenty-two per cent of debtors with credit card debts owed more
than $10,000 in such debt, and 80 per cent of this group possessed four
or more cards (see Tables 12 and 13, below). In one-third of these cases,
credit card debt constituted over 50 per cent of total liabilities. Among
this sub-group (n=71), only 38 per cent owed debts to banks, and only
50 per cent had any debts to financial institutions. None owned a home,
and they had a median total liability of $22,850 (the mean was $26,190)
and median total assets of only $1,100. Their median annual income was
slightly lower than the general sample at $17,376. They were of a similar
age to other bankrupts, with a slightly higher percentage of men to
women than in the general sample (60 per cent men to 40 per cent
women). Thirty-six per cent were married, 27 per cent were single, and
30 per cent were separated or divorced. In 39 per cent of cases, an
adverse employment change was cited as a cause of bankruptcy by the
trustee. These data might provide some support for the hypothesis that,

10 7

See Canadian Bankers Association, "Fast Stats-Credit Cards" (31 October 1998), online:
Canadian Bankers Association <http://www.cba.ca/englStatistics/Faststats/ faststs.htm#F> (date
accessed: 10 August 1999).
108 See Angus Reid, Canadiansand Credit: Report Preparedfor Ernst & Young (Toronto: Ernst
& Young, 1997), online: Ernst and Young <http:llwww.eycan.com/isr/surveys/Credit.doe> (date
accessed: 2 July 1999).
109 See, for example, L.M. Ausubel, "Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and
Bankruptcy" (1997) 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 249, which demonstrated that high credit card profitability
in the United States was correlated with increases in bankruptcy.
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for this group, credit cards were the last source of credit that debtors
were able to access before the necessity of declaring bankruptcy.
TABLE 12
TOTAL CREDIT CARD DEBT
Per Cent

Debt ($)

1-999
1,000-1,999
2,000-2,999
3,000-3,999
4,000-4,999
5,000-5,999
6,000-6,999
7,000-7,999
8,000-8,999
9,000-9,999
10,000+
Total
Median=$4,800
n=927

12.2

11.9
8.8
10.7
8.7
7.9
6.0
4.7
3.5
3.0
22.5
100.0

TABLE 13
TOTAL NUMBER OF CREDIT CARDS

Credit Cards

Per Cent
22.9

Total
n=932

20.0
18.1
12.3
8.0
5.6
5.4
2.6
2.4
2.6
100.0
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Forty-four per cent of debtors had at least one retail store debt
that did not appear to be attributable to a credit card; among this group,
the mean debt was $12,225 and the median debt was $1,595.
c) Debts owed to professionalsand landlords
•One-hundred and thirty bankrupts owed debts to professionals,
with a mean of $11,693 and a median of $1,000. Twenty-five per cent
owed less than $300 and 25 per cent owed more than $5,900. Only 20
debtors owed rent to landlords, with a mean of $3,150 and a median of
$1,750.
d) Government debts
The primary creditor here was Revenue Canada, to whom 34 per
cent of debtors owed debts. In those cases where the outstanding debt
was known at the time of bankruptcy (n=388), the median debt was
$4,000 and the mean $22,982. Twenty-five per cent owed less than
$1,000, and 21 per cent owed more than $20,000 to Revenue Canada. In
the cases over $20,000, there was an opposition to discharge in 17 of the
82 cases (9 by creditor and 8 by trustee). It is surprising that there should
be such a high number of debts to Revenue Canada, since the great
majority of individual wage-earners receive refunds from Revenue
Canada. These data are another indicator of the extent to which this
sample of bankrupts includes individuals who may be engaged in
business or self-employed.
Debtors had liabilities in relation to a number of other
government creditors. These included the Goods and Services Tax (6sT)
(5 per cent), Employment Insurance and Department of Employment
and Immigration (3.4 per cent), Municipalities (13 per cent),
Community and Social Services (0.9 per cent), Canada Housing and
Mortgage Corporation (CHMC) (0.6 per cent), and other government
bodies (9.8 per cent). While the total amount of debt outstanding to
government agencies is significantly less than that owed to financial
institutions, the government is a reluctant creditor in many individual
bankruptcies. Two-hundred and thirty-seven debtors owed debts to
utilities.
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e) Student loans
Nine per cent of bankrupts had student loan debts, with a mean
of $8,759 and a median of $6,000. Eighteen per cent of bankrupts had
student loan arrears of $15,000 or more. In over 27 per cent of these
cases (n=18), there was an opposition to discharge, with the majority of
oppositions being instituted by the student loan creditor. A striking
finding in relation to student loan debt was that over twice as many
women as men had student loan debt (74 compared with 35), and
women had slightly higher levels of student loan debt.
f) Litigationjudgment
There were a very small number of cases where there was a large
litigation judgment identified in the Statement of Affairs. Of these 5
cases, 4 resulted in an opposition to discharge by either the creditor (3)
or the trustee (1). The nature of the discharge was conditional in 1 case,
with the debtor required to pay $25,000; in the remaining 3 cases, 1
debtor consented to judgment, and 2 received suspended discharges.
g) Individualsand other debts
Three-hundred and eight debtors (23 per cent) owed one or
more debts to individuals, with a mean of $33,000 and a median of
$8,584. I have not concluded coding these individual cases, but a
significant number appear to be private lenders. There were 22 per cent
of debtors with other debts, with a mean of $19,879 and a median of
$2,000.
F. Causes of Bankruptcy as Perceived by Trustees
Trustees are required by the BIA to record their opinion on the
causes of the bankruptcy.1 1 0 This is usually a one- or two-sentence
explanation. In some cases, there is merely the statement "unable to pay
debts as they come due," while in others there will be a reference to
multiple causes, such as "unemployment, loss of income, financial
mismanagement," or "unemployment and excessive borrowing," with no
110

See hA, supra note 2, s. 170(1)(b).
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attempt to rank the causes. There is obviously a question of judgement
here, and different trustees may interpret the cause of bankruptcy in a
different manner. After discarding explanations that stated only "unable
to pay debts as they come due," I developed a coding scheme that
attempted to capture both single- and multiple-cause bankruptcies. If a
trustee mentioned more than one cause, such as "marriage breakdown
and unemployment," this was coded as "marriage breakdown and ... ." It
would not be coded under any of the single-cause categories, such as
adverse employment change or marital breakdown. Thus, the coding
separated multiple causes of bankruptcy from cases in which a single
cause, such as unemployment, was identified. No case was coded under
more than one category.1 1 1 Table 14, below, outlines the causes for the
full sample and for pure consumer debtors.112
There are several important points flowing from the findings
reported in Table 14. First, adverse employment change dominates as a
single cause of bankruptcy. This category included loss of employment,
loss of spousal employment, and long-term unemployment. These
findings may be related to the high level of unemployment in the sample.
Second, there is a large number of business-related bankruptcies. In
addition to business failure, the guarantee cases invariably related to a
failed business, and it would be appropriate to describe a real estate
investment failure as a failed business venture. The relatively large
number of bankruptcies related to personal guarantees for business
debts deserves further investigation, in the light of the concerns that
have been raised in recent years over the circumstances in which such
guarantees are given by spouses and family members of the business
owner.1 1 3 Third, "pure" credit overextension represents a subset rather
than a major cause of bankruptcy. In many cases, there was a
combination of loss of income and overextension. The category of
"inadequate income" also deserves some comment. This included
references to inadequate and insufficient income, as well as "low
income." It is not always clear whether the trustee is indicating that the
cause of insufficient income was credit overextension. It could also relate

111 Jay Westbrook, in his comments on my draft paper, noted that it was not clear whether
cases had been coded under more than one category: see J.L. Westbrook, "Comparative
Empiricism" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 143 at 146, n. 18. 1 have take the opportunity to add this

sentence to make it clear that no case was coded under more than one category. This was intended
to identify single- and multiple-cause bankruptcies.
112 For a definition of "pure consumer" debtor, see discussion in Part Il(E), above.
113 See B. Fehlberg, Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1997).
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to the problems of a subset of debtors making ends meet on low
incomes. Marriage breakdown was rarely a single cause; it was usually
combined with another cause, including unemployment, the costs of
divorce, loss on the sale of home, and depression. There was also a subcategory of cases in which debtors declared bankruptcy because there
was a deficiency on the sale of their home. These were almost invariably
cases where a creditor had exercised its power of sale in relation to the
bankrupt's home. Coupled with the role of real estate investment
failures, they illustrate the impact of volatility in real estate markets in
contributing to increases in bankruptcy.
TABLE 14*
CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCY AS PERCEIVED BY TRUSTEES
Cause

All Debtors (%)

24
Adverse Employment Change
14
Business Failure
9
Overextension
9
Inadequate/Insufficient Income
9
Loss of Income and Overextension
8
Marital Breakdown and ...
6
Loss on Sale of Home/Deficiency Claim
5
Real Estate Investment Failure
5
Guarantor
Adverse Employment Change
4
Related to Health
3
Tax Liability
2
Mismanagement of Finances
2
Marital Breakdown
Other
100
Total
n=684
n=819

Pure Consumer
Debtors (%)
28
10

10
10
8
6
6
6

4

* Percentages may not add to 100 per cent due to rounding.

The majority of bankruptcies appear to be caused by an
unfortunate change in life circumstances, such as adverse employment
changes or business failure. There are a minority of cases of fiscal
imprudence, and the inadequate income category raises the question of
the connection between chronically low income and bankruptcy. Most
individuals appear to be the casualties of the severe downturn in the
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Ontario economy during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which
precipitated high rates of unemployment, a large shake-out of many
small businesses, and a severe drop in real estate values.
Among consumer bankrupts, there is also a dominance of
adverse employment changes. What is surprising is the significant
number of consumers who identify business failure and personal
guarantees (the vast majority of which are given in relation to small
businesses) as a cause of bankruptcy. Combined with those classified as
real estate investment failures, clearly more than 10 per cent of pure
consumer debtors might be more appropriately classified as businessrelated cases.
G. Specific Categoriesof Bankrupts
Bankrupts are not a homogenous group, and one of the valuable
contributions of the studies by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook was
their analysis of differing sub-groups of bankrupts. We have already
noted the large number of self-employed individuals in the sample. In
this section I offer some preliminary findings on three further groups of
bankrupts: women, repeaters, and household bankruptcies.
1. Women in bankruptcy
The file study indicates an increase in women who file for
bankruptcy compared with those studied by Brighton and Connidis in
the 1970s. Women may file as single individuals, as separated or
divorced persons, or with their partner. A general comparison of male
and female filers indicates similar incomes and liabilities, higher
numbers of women not in the labour force or unemployed, and a slightly
younger median age for female bankrupts (38 for males, and 36 for
females). I was interested in pursuing the more finely grained analysis of
female filers, first adopted by Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, in which
women filers are analyzed under the categories of married and
unmarried (i.e., not currently married or living common law, including
women who were separated, divorced, or widowed). I adopted these
categories, and added also a category of individuals who identified
themselves as single (i.e., never married or common law).
Single women (n=96) appeared to be slightly better off
financially than single men (n=112). Single women earned a median
monthly income of $1,243, while single men earned $1,076. Single men
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and women had a similar median age (31), which was significantly
younger than the general population of bankrupts (38). Single women
had slightly higher levels of assets (mediail for women, $1,500; for men,
$1,450), and also a marginally higher level of home-ownership (8 women
owned a home, compared with 4 men). Single women had slightly higher
levels of employment than single men (64 per cent of women employed
compared with 59 per cent of men). Single women were far more likely
to have dependants than single men, with 27 per cent of women having
one or more dependant, compared to only 5 per cent of men in this
category. In terms of occupations, only 4.2 per cent (n=3) of single
women were unskilled labourers, compared with 22 per cent (n= 19) of
men, and 28 per cent of single women were in skilled clerical
occupations, compared with 5.9 per cent of men.
There was a similar pattern within the larger "unmarried"
category, with women again having higher median monthly incomes than
men ($1,380 to $1,250), and a slightly higher level of assets including
homes. Women in this group also had a much higher number of
dependants under 21. Forty-nine per cent had one or more dependant,
whereas only 23 per cent of men had one or more dependants.
The final category for analysis was married women. One of the
striking findings here was the extent to which women in these
households were dependent on their partner's income and other income
support. Only 49 per cent of married women were employed, and their
individual net monthly income was a median of $494. Seventy-one per
cent of males in this category were employed, with a median individual
monthly income of $1,395. There were two or more dependants under 21
in 41 per cent of these households. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
found that married couples in bankruptcy were generally one-income
families, 1 14 and my findings seem to suggest a similar pattern in this
sample.
The general file study findings in relation to gender and
bankruptcy differ from those of other studies, which indicated that
women bankrupts were generally in worse economic circumstances than
men. However, although single and unmarried women are slightly better
off than their male counterparts, they have higher numbers of
dependants-a fact that would in many cases place them in a worse
economic situation than their male counterparts.

11 4

SeeAs We Forgive Our Debtors,supra note 34 at 156.
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2. Household bankruptcies
Since 1992, it has been possible for related persons to file a joint
bankruptcy where their debts are substantially the same. 115 One
rationale for this measure was the reduction of costs to a household
declaring bankruptcy. A significant finding in the study was the extent to
which it is households, rather than individuals, that are declaring
bankruptcy. This did not appear initially from the file data, which
indicated that only 8 per cent of filings were recorded as joint filings.
However, a bankruptcy file often indicated a cross-reference to a
bankruptcy for a person with the same surname as the debtor, and this
was usually the next file. The great majority of these cases represented
married debtors. I discovered therefore that trustees often processed
two bankruptcies for related individuals, and thus coded these as "joint
but separate." These filings accounted for approximately 26 per cent of
all filings. In 86 per cent of the cases, the parties were married, 6 per
cent were separated or divorced, and 5 per cent were in a common-law
relationship. Household bankruptcies therefore constitute about 34 per
cent of the sample. 116 Within this group, there is a higher level of homeownership (39 per cent at the time of bankruptcy), a higher median
monthly income ($2,031), and higher levels of total assets (40 per cent
with over $21,000 in assets).
Trustees whom I interviewed were, in general, unenthusiastic
about joint filings, and some seemed to interpret the legislation as
requiring identical liabilities. It is also true that joint bankruptcies are
less profitable than two separate bankruptcies, and this was mentioned
as a disincentive by a number of trustees. These findings underline the
central role of the professional practices of trustees in the bankruptcy
process, who may undermine legislative objectives, such as the reduction
of costs for households declaring bankruptcy. Recognition of the
household bankruptcy also suggests the need to think more

115 See BIA, supra note 2, s. 155(0; and Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Directive
No. 2: Joint Filing(issued 7 December 1992), as revised by Directive No. 2R: Joint Filing (issued 19

December 1997), online: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy <http:l/strategis.ic.gc/SSG/
br0092e.html> (date accessed: 10 August 1999).
116 In the United States, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook found that 57 per cent of their
filings were joint filings (restricted to husband and wife): seeAs We Forgive Our Debtors,supra note
34 at 149.
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systematically about the impact of bankruptcy on the family unit and
family assets.1 17
3. Repeaters: previous bankrupts
Repeat bankruptcies are of interest for several reasons. In
Canada, unlike the United States, there is no limitation on the frequency
with which one may declare bankruptcy. In addition, the repeat bankrupt
is often a symbolic figure in debates on bankruptcy, pictured
alternatively as the smart operator using bankruptcy as a "fiscal car
wash," or the inadequate person with personality disorders. The latter
image seems to have had. some influence on the introduction of
counselling in 1992,118 since it was assumed that counselling might
prevent this repeat behaviour.
Eight per cent of the sample were previous bankrupts, and four
individuals, or 0.4 per cent of the sample, had been bankrupt on two
previous occasions. I was interested in knowing when this group had
previously filed for bankruptcy, and I obtained these data for the great
majority of repeaters. Table 15, below, indicates the date of when the
bankrupts were discharged on their first bankruptcy.
TABLE 15
PREVIOUS BANKRUPTCY: DATE OF DISCHARGE
Date
Before 1 January 1980

1 January 1980-31 December 1984
1 January 1985-31 December 1989
1 January 1990-30 December 1993
Total
n=82; missing=13

Per Cent
18.3

32.4
30.5
18.3
100.0

Fifty per cent of previous bankrupts were discharged at least
nine years before their second bankruptcy. We were able to obtain the
117

See A. Clarke, "Insolvent Families" in H. Rajak, ed., Insolvency Law: Theory and Practice

(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) 83.
118 See mA, supra note 2, s. 157.1(1). See also Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy,
Directive IR2: Counselling in Insolvency Matters (issued 21 December 1994), online: Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSGIbrOlO91e.html> (date accessed: 5

August 1999).
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causes of the first bankruptcy in only 27 cases. The following were
indicated as the causes: business failure (8); investment failure (1);
marital breakdown (5); adverse employment change (8); over-extension
(5); Revenue Canada (1); injury, illness, or accident (4); and garnishee
(1). The two most frequent causes were business failure and lack of
employment, followed by over-extension.
Previous bankrupts were older than the general sample, with a
median age of 44. The median monthly income was slightly higher at
$1,917. The median total liabilities were also higher at $49,959. Fewer
had credit card debt, with only 68.5 per cent showing one or more creditcard debt, and a slightly smaller percentage owned a home (21 per cent).
The reasons for the repeat bankruptcy did not differ markedly from the
general sample. The significant numbers of repeat business failures
emphasize the high-risk nature of small business and self-employment.
It is also relevant to mention that previous bankrupts were
subject to greater official scrutiny in the bankruptcy process. There is no
automatic discharge for a repeat bankrupt,11 9 and a larger proportion of
creditors objected to the discharge of repeaters. In addition, a much
higher number than in the general sample were subject to an official
examination by the official receiver (47 per cent of repeaters, compared
with 14 per cent in the general sample).
H. The Bankruptcy Process
The bankruptcy documents provide information on the formal
aspects of the process, from the assignment in bankruptcy until the
debtor is discharged. They also include data on pre-bankruptcy actions
taken by creditors and by the bankrupt.
1. Pre-bankruptcy activity
The Statement of Affairs requires a bankrupt to indicate whether
any assets have been seized or disposed of in the year preceding
bankruptcy, and to indicate any dispositions of real estate in the five
years preceding bankruptcy. Eighteen per cent had disposed of assets
within twelve months of bankruptcy and, in 14 per cent of cases, assets
had been seized by creditors. Twenty-seven per cent had disposed of real
estate within five years of their bankruptcy. These findings record both
119

See BtA, supranote 2, ss. 168.1(1), 172(2)(a), 173(1)0).
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the limited number of cases in which formal collection actions had been
instituted against a bankrupt in the year preceding bankruptcy, and the
significant number of individuals who had sold or disposed of real estate
in the five years preceding bankruptcy. The trustees included within this
category some "forced disposals" that were further to the exercise of a
power of sale by a mortgage holder.
The majority of pre-bankruptcy seizure actions involved homes
under power of sale, 120 and repossession by a secured creditor of an
automobile. There were a small number of wage garnishments by
finance companies or Revenue Canada. It is not surprising that there
was little attempt by unsecured creditors to seize the personal property
of a debtor, given our earlier findings on the asset position of debtors. In
addition, wage garnishment would not be relevant against the large
numbers of debtors who were unemployed, and would be difficult to use
against the self-employed. We can conclude that, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, seizure of assets was by secured creditors who would
be able to exercise self-help remedies, or the relatively swift power of
sale of real estate.
A striking finding is the number of voluntary and forced
disposals of real estate in the period leading up to bankruptcy. While
there may be many reasons for the disposal of a home (moving, family
breakdown, attempting to evade creditors by transferring assets to a
relative or friend), a not uncommon notation on the Statement of
Affairs was "sold home ... debtor used portion ... to maintain living
expenses and sustain life," or "proceeds from sale went to pay creditors,"
or "sold house further to separation ... funds spent on paying bills and
living expenses for ex-spouse."ll
These findings are of interest in understanding the relationship
of bankruptcy to the individual debt collection process. Bankrupts might
be viewed as a subset of those individuals who have their wages
garnisheed or their general assets seized under writs of execution. The
evidence suggests, however, that we cannot assume this to be true given
the limited number of formal actions taken by creditors against
bankrupts.

120 Ontario permits a power of sale procedure that is more advantageous to a secured creditor
than the more drawn-out procedure of foreclosure. Seizure under power of sale is not permitted in
certain provinces and many American states.
121 File Study, supra note 47.
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2. From assignment to discharge
An overwhelming number of individual bankrupts (98.3 per cent)
make a voluntary assignment in bankruptcy rather than being petitioned
into bankruptcy by a creditor. This is itself of interest since much sociolegal work on consumers, and in particular consumer-debtors, has
stressed the relative passivity of debtors in the face of debt collection
measures, and an unwillingness to turn to third parties for advice or
help. The actual processing of the assignment in bankruptcy may often
be done by a trustee, but the individual will have had to make the
decision to visit a trustee in bankruptcy. Most existing literature on
remedy-seeking by consumers suggests that individuals are reluctant to
turn to third parties when they have a consumer problem. "Avoidance"
is often a common response to problems. The dominance of major life
changes, such as unemployment and business failure, in the reasons for
bankruptcy provide some support for the argument that it is only when
avoidance becomes impossible under the pressure of major problems
that individuals turn to the third-party trustee.
In 1994, there was an automatic discharge for a first-time
bankrupt nine months after an assignment. 122 In addition, there is a
summary administration procedure for bankrupts where the realizable
assets of a bankrupt will be $5,000 or less after deduction of the claims of
secured creditors. 123 This procedure is, as its name implies, a more
streamlined process that is subject to a fixed tariff of fees, and also
permits joint bankruptcies by individuals whose affairs might be treated
as one estate. The overwhelming majority of files in the sample were
summary administration, with 2 per cent converting to ordinary
administration. An additional requirement since 1992 has been that an
individual must submit to two counselling sessions as a condition of
receiving his or her discharge. 12 4 The main steps in the process after the
assignment are the creditors' meeting, which is often combined with the
initial counselling session, the requirement of a section 170 report by a
trustee, and a second counselling session shortly before discharge. There
is also the possibility of an official examination of the debtor by the

122

See BIA, supra note 2, s. 168.1(1).

123 Ibid. s. 49(6).
124

Seesupra note 118.
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official receiver, and there may be an objection to discharge that will
trigger the need for a judicial hearing. 125
It appeared from the files that the process was relatively
routinized for the great majority of debtors. Although there was a
requirement of a creditors' meeting, there appeared to be some form of
creditor participation in these meetings in a very small number of cases.
There was an official examination of the debtor by the official receiver in
14 per cent of cases, and an opposition to discharge in 14 per cent of
cases.
3. Discharge and opposition to discharge
Under the BIA there are several potential grounds for objection
to discharge that may result in the refusal, suspension, or granting of a
conditional discharge.12 6 Almost all individual debtors could potentially
be subject to objection on the ground that the "assets of the bankrupt
are not of a value equal to fifty cents on the dollar on the amount of his
unsecured liabilities." The overwhelming majority of debtors fall within
this category. However, Table 16, below, indicates that there was an
opposition to discharge in only 14 per cent of cases, and that in only 5
per cent of cases was there an opposition by a creditor. The majority of
oppositions are brought by trustees, and I found that in many of these
cases, where there is an opposition, it is withdrawn before the date for
hearing.
TABLE 16
OPPOSITION TO DISCHARGE
OpposingParty
Superintendent of Bankruptcy
Creditor
Trustee
Unopposed
Total
n=1,118; missing=29

Per Cent
0.3
5.7
8.6
85.4
100.0

125 See BiA, supra note 2, ss. 158(c) (official examination), 168.1(1) (envisaging possibility of

objection to discharge).
126 See ibik s. 173(1).
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Why do trustees oppose discharge? The section 170 report,
prepared shortly before discharge, usually provided some information
here. An occasional comment was that the "debtor has failed to make a
payment ... as per the voluntary agreement."12 7 Trustee opposition

appears to be used in a significant number of cases as a method of
ensuring that there will be sufficient assets to pay the trustee's "fee."
This was confirmed in interviews with trustees, where there were
differing views as to the propriety of this practice. In the Toronto
bankruptcy district, there were long delays in 1994 in obtaining a court
hearing date, so that an opposition could be made and withdrawn
without the necessity of actually appearing before the registrar or a
judge. Thus, one trustee who indicated a practice of objecting to
discharge, if a debtor did not pay money into the estate as promised,
commented:
I tell the bankrupt I am opposing because you haven't paid my fee ... now once we file
the opposition the discharge does not happen, but there is often a six-month period or
more before that gets to court. That gives the bankrupt time to give me what I want, and I
just take back [the opposition] ... and they usually fix it up in the end. 128

The practice of trustees objecting to discharge because of nonpayment of fees is controversial, and there are varying local practices by
bankruptcy registrars on this question. I have been informed that
registrars in Vancouver and Montreal will not permit trustees to recover
their "fees" in this manner. 129 These aspects of local legal culture will
affect trustees' practice in how they ensure that they are paid by
bankrupts.
I have not analyzed comprehensively the data on discharge
oppositions and their outcomes. It appears, however, that creditors
opposed discharge primarily in the case of business-related bankruptcies
and real estate investment failures, and these were generally cases where
there was either a substantial debt (over $50,000), or allegations of
fraud. These comprised the majority of objections. There were a small
number of Canada Student Loan objections (9). However, there were no
objections by credit card companies, only one by a consumer retailer,
and a small number by consumer finance companies. For the ordinary
consumer debtor who does not have a large deficiency on a mortgage
127 File Study, supra note 47.
128

Supra note 96.

129 J.H. Todd, "Address" (Conference on the Contemporary Challenges of Consumer

Bankruptcies in a Comparative Context, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 21-22 August 1998
[unpublished]. John Todd is a practising trustee in bankruptcy.
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and owes primarily consumer debts, it would appear that there is little
likelihood of creditors objecting to discharge. One might presume that
this reluctance to oppose is based on a cost-benefit analysis in relation to
the returns from individual cases; any money paid into court on a
successful opposition will be shared with other creditors.
In the case of an opposition to discharge, any money paid into
the estate is for the benefit of all creditors. I was not able to track in the
files those cases where an individual creditor attempted to have his or
her debt survive bankruptcy by an allegation that the debt had been
obtained by fraud. Nor do the file data inform us of the practices of
"repeat player" creditors in dealing with bankrupt consumers. A major
concern in the United States has been the practice of creditors obtaining
reaffirmations of debts that have been discharged in bankruptcy. There
is anecdotal evidence of this occurring in Ontario, but I do not know the
extent of the practice.1 30
In 1994, bankruptcy was, for the vast majority of debtors, a
routinized administrative process in which they would not have to face
their creditors or appear in court. The fact that the process is routinized,
however, does not mean that it is not a traumatic process for the
bankrupt, just as "no fault" divorce does not necessarily reduce the
trauma of marital breakdown.
I. Asset Realization
The data on asset realization are incomplete, since some files
were not complete in 1998. In the 973 cases where I have collected data,
the mean total receipts were $3,475, and the median $2,433. In over 40
per cent of cases, the receipts were $2,000 or less. Tables 17 and 18,
below, indicate the receipts and the sources of these receipts.

130 1 was informed that a legal firm in Toronto that acted for creditors had sent letters to
debtors asking them to reaffirm their debts. In addition, there is reference to reaffirmation in a
journalist's account of his bankruptcy: see J. Smith, "Zero and Counting-How I Went Bankrupt: A
Model of Our Times" This Magazine (August 1992) 33.
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TABLE 17
TOTAL RECEIPTS
Receipts ($)

Per Cent

0-999
1,000-1,999
2,000-2,999
3,000-3,999
4,000-4,999
5,000-5,999
6,000-6,999
7,000-7,999
8,000-8,999
9,000-9,999
10,000+
Total
n=973

7.5
32.8
19.6
13.9
8.2
4.1
4.1
3.3
1.4
2.0
3.1
100.0

TABLE 18
SOURCE OF RECEIPTS
Number
Payments by Debtor
Conditional Order
Pre-Bankruptcy
Income Tax
Post-Bankruptcy
Income Tax
Other Tax
GST
Sale of Motor Vehicle
Sale of Other Assets
Other Receipts
n=973

Mean ($) Median ($)

Std. Dv. ($)

782
20

891
3,167

936
925

694
5,741

508

1,185

834

1,250

773
140
562
207
81
271

1,145
1,537
479
816
1,760
982

797
544
356
500
590
$275

1,042
5,090
1,964
1,202
3,303
2,036

The data in Table 18 reveals large variations in the amounts
received, so that the data on means are likely to be influenced by a
number of large outliers. The main sources of receipts in 1994 were
payments by debtors and the pre- and post-bankruptcy income tax
returns. Pre- and post-bankruptcy income tax returns constitute 17 per
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cent and 26 per cent, respectively, of total receipts, while payments by
debtors represent 20 per cent, and GST represented 7.9 per cent of
receipts. Sales of motor vehicles or other assets occur in a much smaller
percentage of cases. It is relevant to note that "sale" of the motor vehicle
does not necessarily mean that the debtor has lost the use of the
automobile. In a number of cases, the trustee sells the automobile back
to the bankrupt, or the bankrupt will get a friend or relative to bid for it.
In some cases the payment will be by instalments. In at least 10 per cent
of cases where an automobile was sold, there was a clear indication in
the file that it had been sold back to a debtor. Similarly, the "sale of
other assets" would often include the case where a bankrupt with equity
in a home has made some contribution to the estate from his or her
equity.
1. Costs of administration
Before unsecured creditors receive a dividend, preferred
creditors must be satisfied, which in the vast majority of individual files is
represented by the expenses and remuneration of the trustee. (There is
also the levy of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.) The trustees'
disbursements included the filing fee of $50 and counselling fees of $170.
In 6 cases, legal fees were payable. The median trustee remuneration is
$1,491 (mean $1,569), with 25 per cent receiving less than $1,200 and 25
per cent over $1,800.
Table 19, below, shows the amount available for distribution to
unsecured creditors. The median amount available for distribution to
unsecured creditors was $558, and the mean was $1,639. In 24.1 per cent
of cases, there were no assets to distribute. Expressed as a creditors'
dividend, the median dividend was 3.22 per cent, and the mean was 12.5
per cent. In 10 per cent of cases, over 24 per cent was paid as a dividend.
In 10 cases, more than 100 per cent was available for distribution.
Although the dividends are in general very modest, there are fewer "no
asset" cases than in American studies.
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TABLE 19
AMOUNT AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION
TO UNSECURED CREDITORS
Amount Available Cs)

Per Cent

0
1-499
500-999
1,000-1,499
1,500-1,999
2,000-2,499
2,500-2,999
3,000-3,499

24.1
23.7
13.1
9.3
6.7
4.7
3.2
1.8

3,500-3,999

2.2

4,000-4,499
4,500-4,999
5,000+
Total
Median=$558
n=974

2.4
1.3
7.0
100.0

TABLE 20
RATIO OF UNSECURED PROVED DEBT
TO UNSECURED DECLARED DEBT
Unsecured ProvedDebt

Per Cent

as a Percentageof
DeclaredDebt (%)

0-25

12.6

25-50

15.3

50-75
75-100
1-200
200+
Total
n=908

18.3
24.9
21.6
7.4
100.0

Table 20, above, indicates the ratio of unsecured proved debt
(i.e., where creditors file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy) to
unsecured debt declared by the debtor in his or her Statement of Affairs.
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This shows that, in over 70 per cent of cases, the unsecured declared
debt is equal to or higher than the amounts ultimately claimed by
creditors. It suggests that some unsecured creditors do not file proof of a
claim in bankruptcy, perhaps based on a cost-benefit calculation of the
small amount that they would recover on individual files. It is also the
case that, in 29 per cent of cases, the Statement of Affairs understates
the amount owing by the bankrupt. In these cases, there were higher
numbers of bankrupts who had indicated ownership of a home on their
Statement of Affairs (38 per cent compared with 25 per cent), and the
inflation in proved claims may be partly accounted for by mortgage
holders seizing the home after the declaration of bankruptcy, and
making a later claim for a deficiency.
J. FinancingBankruptcy: What PriceDoes the DebtorPay?

It may be useful to examine the process in terms of the financial
price that the debtor pays to use bankruptcy, since one might assume
that, along with the non-financial costs (which might be significant), this
will affect its use by individuals. A debtor must give up non-exempt
assets and pay a filing fee of $50. There is also a fee of $170 for two
counselling sessions. In order to use the bankruptcy process, the debtor
must find a trustee to process the bankruptcy. It is sometimes stated that
the "cost" of bankruptcy is $1,200, since this is a common amount that
trustees quote to potential bankrupts. It is also common to refer to this
as the "fee," even though the bankrupt is not the client of the trustee,
and the fee is determined by a tariff that is a percentage of assets
realized. The trustee will generally require the debtor to make a
voluntary payment into the estate. This may be $1,200, or it may be less
if there is expectation of an income tax rebate. Payments for the fee are
often spread over several months and, in some cases, the trustee may
require a third-party guarantee of the fee. The debtor will generally be
required to contribute to the estate any pre- and post-bankruptcy
income tax return, the amount of which may often not be known at the
time of bankruptcy. In addition, if the debtor owns an automobile that is
not secured, he or she may have to give it up, keep it in return for an
income payment, or arrange for a friend or relative to pay. It is possible
that a payment will be required if the debtor has some equity in his or
her home. It is not clear how much bargaining goes on between trustee
and bankrupt over these issues, but at least one trustee indicated that
there would be bargaining over fees.
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If one includes only the post-bankruptcy income tax return and
voluntary payments, then many bankrupts will "pay" more than $1,200.
For example, for those debtors who both made voluntary payments and
had a post-bankruptcy income tax return, the median combined amount
was $1,733 and the mean was $2,036. This is a substantial amount of
money for a person in the financial position of most bankrupts.
However, at the time of filing for bankruptcy, many bankrupts will not
have to hand over any assets. Apart from an automobile, they will not
lose any personal property, and they may be able to keep the automobile
on a promise to make payments to the trustee. They will, in many cases,
have to make a down payment towards the bankruptcy, but the balance
will also be a promise. One of the most significant assets that they will
lose, the money from income tax returns, is an expectation. If this is
$1,000, they do not have to give up $1,000, but merely forego the
expectation. There is much psychological-economic literature that
indicates that individuals value more highly an existing asset in their
possession than the same asset viewed as a lost expectation.131 It is
possible, therefore, that the existing method of financing bankruptcy
may reduce the impact of the relatively high price on the willingness of
an individual to use bankruptcy.
The payments to the trustee will represent the total financial
costs that a bankrupt will have to pay, since individual bankrupts in
Canada are rarely represented by lawyers. There is no consumer
bankruptcy bar similar to that in the United States. These data suggest
that the cost of a bankruptcy in Ontario in 1994 was higher than in the
United States. Jean Braucher indicates in her study that the legal fees
for a bankruptcy ranged from a low median of US$300-$350 in Dayton,
Ohio, to a median of US$700-$750 in Austin, Texas.132 Even with the
addition of the filing fee in the United States, it would seem that Ontario
bankrupts pay more than their American counterparts.
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
It appears that, for many individuals in this sample, bankruptcy
provided a valuable safety net against the consequences of the severe
downturn and structural adjustment of the Ontario economy in the late
131 For a general discussion of this effect, see J.D. Hanson & D.A. Kysar, "Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation" (1999) 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630 at
673.
132 See Braucher, supra note 43 at 547.
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1980s and early 1990s. To describe the bankrupts studied here as cases
of "consumer" bankruptcy is something of a misnomer, since not only
are significant numbers of consumer bankruptcies related to the
operations of small business, but the description "consumer" bankruptcy
implies, in popular understanding, a close relationship between
consuming (or over-consuming) credit and bankruptcy, with the
accompanying image of the overspending consumer. The data indicate,
rather, that changes in income are the major reason for most
bankruptcies. A central factor here is adverse employment change. In
addition, the substantial numbers of bankruptcies related to the
downturn in the real estate market do not fit stereotypes of the
consumer running up large credit card debts. Nor are the cases of
complications arising from marital breakdown explicable as simple cases
of overextension. There are also indications that, for a sub-group of the
sample, inadequate income may be a continuing problem. These data
suggest that individual bankruptcy files provide a signal of economic
problems, which are often attributable to broader economic and social
forces. Bankruptcy policy is unlikely to have an impact on these broader
forces, and is primarily a safety net against entrepreneurial risk and
unstable employment.
There are few bankrupts among the highest status occupations,
but bankrupts are not clustered at the bottom of the occupational scale.
There is also a higher level of home-ownership among our sample of
bankrupts than indicated by other Canadian studies, which may be
accounted for partly by the methods of data collection used in these
studies. The file study does provide some support for the Sullivan,
Warren, and Westbrook thesis that bankruptcy is not concentrated
among a marginal group of individuals, but is a remedy used by a
relatively broad section of "ordinary individuals." For more than onethird of the sample, bankruptcy is a household rather than an individual
decision.
Although the absolute amount of debt owed by many bankrupts
is not high, there is little evidence to indicate that bankrupts are in a
position to repay a substantial portion of their debts at the time of
bankruptcy. They have extremely high debt-to-income ratios compared
with the general population. Only 6 per cent had "surplus income" of
more than $300 at the time of bankruptcy and, in these cases, there was a
higher level of creditor opposition to discharge (9 per cent), and larger
income amounts paid into the estate by the bankrupt. At the time of
bankruptcy, few bankrupts have substantial personal property to turn
over to their creditors, and a plausible hypothesis is that those who did
have assets have exhausted them in an attempt to stave off bankruptcy.
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The great majority of bankrupts do manage to make an income
contribution to their estate while they are undischarged bankrupts.
There is little evidence from the data that there are substantial numbers
of individuals who can pay their debts, but are successfully using the
system as a method of "washing out" their debts. Those with substantial
surplus income were more likely to be subject to an objection to
discharge by their creditors, and high-status debtors (those within the
top three occupational categories) or repeaters were more liable to be
subject to the scrutiny of an official examination by the Superintendent
of Bankruptcy (25 per cent and 47 per cent respectively) than other
debtors. It is unclear what triggers the bankruptcy decision, but the dire
financial position of individuals at the time of bankruptcy suggests that it
is being used as a last resort. Much socio-legal literature indicates a
reluctance on the part of consumers to turn to third parties, such as
lawyers or courts, to deal with their disputes, and there is no evidence at
present to indicate that the decision to declare bankruptcy is an
exception to this literature. Following from this observation is the
question, are too few individuals using bankruptcy? This is a question
that goes beyond the scope of this article.
There has been much discussion of the causes of the rising rates
of personal bankruptcy in Canada'and the United States in recent years.
Many writers have pointed to the close relationship between the growth
in individual debt outstanding, high debt-to-disposable income ratios,
and the increase in personal bankruptcy. 133 The financial vulnerability of
many individuals to changes in their economic circumstances is reflected
in my findings on employment change as a major cause of bankruptcy.
The low levels of savings-to-income, in the general population undercut
the margin of safety against changes in economic circumstances.134 This
necessary condition of high debt levels is encouraged by governmental
economic policy and credit institutions. Governmental measures to
increase "consumer confidence" in the economy mean simply that the
government is encouraging more individuals to take on debt. Reducing
controls on. mortgage ratios will lead to an increase in bankruptcy when
there is the inevitable downturn in the economy. In the context of the

133 See Ziegel supra note 9; and Schwartz, supra note 6.
134 In a recent report, the Canadian Council on Social Development charted the financial
vulnerabilty of consumers in terms of low savings rates and high debt-to-income ratios: see
Canadian Council on Social Development, Personal Security Index 1999: How Confident Are
CanadiansAbout Their Economic Well-Being? (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development,
1999) at 10-11, online: Canadian Council on Social Development <http:/www.ccsd.ca/pr/psihle.
htm> (date accessed: 5 July 1999).

1999]

A Socio-LegalAnalysis

causes of bankruptcy, attention has often focused in the United States
on the role of credit card debt. In the sample, it represented a small
percentage of the total debts outstanding. However, we do not know
how credit cards were used by bankrupts. If they are being used as
income substitutes after an unfortunate change of economic
circumstances, or as a method of continuing to finance an'ailing
business, they are a very expensive form of credit, and could be a
significant triggering device for bankruptcy.
The file study indicates that greater investigations should be
made into the practices of financial institutions in taking guarantees
from individual business owners and their spouses, the protection for
home-owners in financial difficulties, and the social costs and benefits
for greater protection of the family home. I have underlined the highrisk nature of self-employment and small business, and one wonders why
government statistics deliberately understate the "bad news" about small
business, since a reasonable estimate is that at least 15-20 per cent of
bankrupts classified as "consumer" bankruptcies are in fact related to
the operation of a small business. There has been much celebration of
the role of self-employment and small business in the new economy, but
based on this study, individuals pay a high personal price for business
failure. One is tempted to make the obvious comparison with large
corporate bankruptcies, where limited liability shields individuals from
the full consequences of failure. In addition, individuals who use credit
cards to keep their small businesses afloat may be viewed quite
differently from the management of corporations that use employees'
income tax withholdings as a method of artificially swelling the capital of
an ailing company.135 Given the special place that small businesses seem
to have in present-day Canadian consciousness, policymakers should
view individual bankruptcy as part of small-business policy.136
As readers may be aware, in 1997, reforms to the BIA created
greater obligations on trustees to ensure that individuals paid money
into the bankruptcy estate, and attempted to channel more debtors into
making proposals rather than declaring straight bankruptcy.137 This was

135 In the recent Supreme Court of Canada case of Royal Bank v. Sparrow Electric Corp.,

[1997] 1 S.C.R. 411, the corporation had failed to remit tax deductions for employees to Revenue
Canada in a desperate bid to swell the capital of the ailing company. I am not aware that any
directors were prosecuted for embezzlement or misappropriation of funds.
136 See discussion of this point in As We Forgive Our Debtors, supra note 34 at 119-21.
137 See

IA,

supra note 2, s. 68, as am. byAn Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,

the Companies' CreditorsArrangementAct and the Income TaxAct, S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 60. For further

discussion of this provision, see Ziegel, supra note 9 at 224.
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based on the perception that it was too easy for individuals to go
bankrupt, and that more higher-income individuals should be
contributing income to their estate. There was no serious empirical basis
for these policy changes, just as there was no empirical basis for the
introduction of mandatory counselling in 1992, or the "ritual
degradation" ceremony, which requires bankrupts to hand over credit
cards to their bankruptcy trustee to be cut up and returned to the credit
card companies.1 3 8
However, even if the articles in this Symposium had been
published before 1997, it is not clear that it would have made any
difference to policymaking. Bankruptcy policymaking in Canada is not a
rational process based on careful socio-economic analysis. Like much of
commercial and consumer credit law, it may be best understood in terms
of interest group analysis, rather than rational policymaking. This is a
trite observation, but it is only recently that scholars have begun to
analyze commercial law from this perspective. One of the characteristics
of bankruptcy policy is that its technical detail has meant that it has been
dominated by insiders-trustees, lawyers, and creditors, with
interventions occasionally by consumer groups. Thus, it was a
combination of creditors, counsellors, and a receptive Superintendent of
Bankruptcy that resulted in the controversial counselling requirements
in 1992.139 The federal Department of Finance was influential in the
process leading to the prohibition on discharge of student loan debts
introduced in 1998.140 There is rarely any voice for the individual
bankrupt within this process. There is also a symbolic nature to
bankruptcy policymaking. Changes are often driven by stereotypes of
consumers abusing credit cards or affluent students casually discharging
their student loans. Policymaking is often a contest over the construction
of the social reality of bankruptcy. Studies such as this one and the one
by Schwartz may at least make it more difficult to justify changes based
on stereotypes without any factual foundation. There is clearly a need
for more systematic ongoing research on the bankruptcy process.

138 See BtA, supra note 2, s. 158(a.1); and Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Directive
No. 3. Duties of the Bankrupt to Deliver CreditCards to the Trustee (issued 7 December 1992), online:
Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy <http:l/strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSGbrOlO93e.html>(date
accessed: 10 August 1999).
139 For a further discussion of this topic, see C.A. Curnock, "Insolvency Counselling
-Innovation Based on the Fourteenth Century" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 387.
140 See BiA, supra note 2, s. 178(1)(g)(ii), as am. by Budget ImplementationAct, 1998, S.C. 1998,
c. 21, s. 103.
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A central actor in the bankruptcy process is the trustee, and it is
necessary to understand the relation of trustees to bankrupts, and the
influence of professional practices on the processing of bankrupts.
Consumer bankruptcy is an industry, and many trustees have routinized
consumer bankruptcy into a profitable system of high-volume
processing. The sample shows that a number of small- and medium-sized
firms are processing large numbers of individual bankruptcies, with only
one or two of the large accountancy firms involved in this area. This was
confirmed by interviews with many of these trustees, who indicated that
a single trustee could handle over thirty files per month, and that some
of the firms, which had further routinized their procedures through the
use of para-legal staff,' 4 ' could process significantly higher numbers. The
file study provides glimpses of the different practices of trustees. Some
trustees processed joint bankruptcies while others did not; some
opposed discharge to obtain their fee, while others disapproved of this
practice. Interviews with trustees suggested that some would bargain
over fees while others would not, while some would be more debtor
oriented than others. None of these findings would be surprising to
socio-legal scholars who have studied the extent to which professionals
mediate the needs of their clients with their professional self-interest,
often sacrificing the former to the latter. 42 The Canadian trustee in
bankruptcy plays a peculiar role, since he or she is an officer of the court
and a representative of the general creditors of the debtor. At the same
time, trustees advertise widely to consumers that they are the people to
turn to if individuals are unable to repay debts, and are often perceived
by creditors to be too close to debtors.
There is also the issue of local legal culture which has been
discussed in American studies. In Canada, this would include the
relationship between trustees, and the local osB and the Registrars in
Bankruptcy. It appears that there are different practices, both within the
different districts in Ontario and throughout the country. A central issue
is how this affects the terms and availability of bankruptcy for
individuals. This relates to the more general issue of the experience of
bankruptcy from the viewpoint of the bankrupt. We know little about
this, and the bankrupt appears as an object rather than a subject in much

141 The technically correct name for these individuals is "estate manager." I use "para-legal"

since this will be more familiar to most readers.
142 See, for example, S. Macaulay, "Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws" (1979) 14 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 115; and W.L.F. Felstiner, "Justice, Power, and Lawyers" in B.G. Garth & A. Sarat, eds.,
Justiceand Power in SociolegalStudies (Evanston, I1.: Northwestern University Press, American Bar

Association, 1998) 55.
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discussion and analysis. If bankruptcy is a consumer remedy, then how
well informed are bankrupts of what occurs in bankruptcy and of what
their options are? What happens to individuals after bankruptcy? Do
they obtain a "fresh start" or is it merely a respite in a continuing battle
with debt problems? The difficulties of obtaining such information
should not prevent it from being an important focus for future research.
Finally, socio-legal study of bankruptcy must be related to other
studies of the operation of the legal system and law in society. Existing
studies of bankruptcy have focused primarily on outlining the distinction
between the law in books and the law in action and, as we might expect,
there is a difference between them. This is hardly novel to those working
in the area of law and society, and we do need to understand more how
findings on bankruptcy-a legal construction related to social issues of
debt and debt repayment-relate to socio-legal analysis of other areas,
such as the use of the legal system by different social groups, the way in
which professionals interact with clients, and the symbolic and
instrumental role of law in legitimating common sense ideals about
bankruptcy and debt. In a path-breaking work written in the early 1970s,
Paul Rock described debt collection as an institution of "low
visibility." 43 This conclusion is certainly true in Canada, as measured by
academic interest, the availability of reliable government statistics, and
studies of such issues as mortgage repossessions, debt collection, or
bankruptcy. Yet it is an area of both practical and theoretical interest
concerning a fundamental aspect of contemporary capitalism-the credit
system-which affects intimately the lives of ordinary Canadians.
When I drove home after editing this article, I noticed a bumper
sticker on a pick-up truck saying, "I owe, I owe-it's off to work I go."
The increasing sophistication of the credit system in recent years, and
the trend towards further liberalization and competition in the consumer
credit market, may result in further penetration of credit in high-risk
markets. But there is also much volatility in this system, which is subject
to periodic crises. While rereading part of this article on the causes of
-bankruptcy, I was reminded of a comment by David Harvey on the
propensity of capitalism to crisis, where he remarked that "these crises
entail ... the devaluation, depreciation and destruction of capital. And

that is never a comfortable process to live with-particularly since it also
entails the devaluation, depreciation and destruction of the labourer." 144

143 See P. Rock, Making People Pay (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).

144 D. Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984) at 97.

